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CRApfm X
INTRODOCTXOli
For it*B Tasasgr this, an* Torairy that, an'
"Chuck him out, the brut«!"
But it's "Ssviour of *is coxsatry»* i0h«n
The guas begin to ahooti
An* it's XoBSBQT this, an' to^m^ that.
An' anything ycwi please;
An' TofflK^ ain't a blooodn' fool—you
Bet that Tosasy sees!
—Kipling-^
The Aiwrican public has becaae iaacreasingly m>
with til© tinited Statw »illtaiy ©ffort in Iiicochina. Althougn ,S.
participation in this unfortunate war had its earliest roots under
the adciinistration of a World Wer II miiitaiy hero, Dwight D.
Usei^ower, ix liiust oe coiisidered prtmaril^r a political war. Our
forces have newer been allowed to fight the war in a manner calculated
to achieve victory. 1?he r^trictions of politics and diplomacy on
all phases of strategy have been e3ctreEiei;y binding on a aiilltary
organization of strong and successful traditions.
The once unchallanged ABierican duty of fitting for one's
cotmtzy when called upon has eroded aw^ in a scraiable to "boat the
draft" in any jsanner possible by msxxy of our young men. The general
dissatisfaction with this war has s?3read froa the young to all age
groups. This growing and pervasive attitude on the part of the
Asksrican people has had a detriisental effect i^on the morale of its
tA
t> m4
h^
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2ndlitfijy s«nrico8. It cannot be explicitly proven but it oeenB
within reaeon to suppose that this morale problem may have beeoi a
factor in the unfortunate occurr«twe of several discreditable isilitaiy
performances recently brought to public attention.
The press has utilised its powerful prerogative of actiiig as
a "watchdog on govenj»ent*» by focusing on our airoed forces' pesrfor-
nance in Indochina, jy^le war corrcMBpondients have been responsible
for publicising the military's unwort^ conduct by keeping stKJh
activity consistently cm the front and editorial pages of the nation's
newqwpers. Tiie press th«Ei has been an eztrwMQy influential factor
in shaping A^iericajti public opinion toward its armed forces. Television
also has had a gz*eat effect. The impact of this conflict h£is been
brought into the very living room of the American people.
What of this attitude of newsHTien toward the anned forces? It
is obviously a matter of considerable iiaportance to the well-being of
our nation. The United States is deeply involved in international
politics and tlie necessity of maintaining a strong militaiy organisa-
tion must be recognised by its citiscMts. It is clear that our military
is approaching a nadir in p^dalic respect Our fitting man therefore
greatly need a more favorable press to return to a position of honor
in the eyes of tiie jteerican people. Such a turnabout can only be
acccnplished by more respor^ible future behavior by our men in unifonu.
iuerica's military leadership is becoming acutely aware of this fact.
Bat it must also be recognized by the press that the e^ortocmings of
the BiHtaiy represent the actions of relatively few of its i^se^owrB.
3 jri
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3Th»8« two influ«ntisl •lora^ents of our society>-thd prMHi and the
militaiy—should »©ek iacprormmnt in rs^port and ccsaauiiications with
OBS another. Each ml^t profit by rocognition of the uaiqu© proble»?iS
of the other iri order that the American public gain by mord roarponaible
conduct from bcth.
If It is accepted that the war iii Indochina has lowered ptoblic
opinion toward the military organization, ^at of this attituito prior
to this conflict? I subult that there has been a tendency within the
civilian population of the United States to observe the military
professico as one of limited prestige for many years. Korris Jaaowitz
makes the point clear in the beginnirag chapter of his book^ The
2
Professional Soldier . The g«asral civilian attitude toward the
aiilitaiy appears to fluctuate dependiiig upon the degr^ of stress
that the coiintay is «aco\mtering in the ar«ia of international poli-
tics. That is, in time of threatening conflict or outright warfare,
military personnel are accepted and r«Eipected in a highly favorable
sanner; whereas in peacetii&e the civilian reaction is scanething less
than favorable. The attitude tends to be one of tolerating a "neees-
saiy evil." Ladislas Farago wrote i "In time of peace, the officers
of the regular Avs^ est«i)li3hment were butts of civilian criticisKi
and ccaidoscension, if not caitecipt, . . ."""^ The SLxaxoples are many.
This interpretation of imerican civilian public opinion i^all be
called the writer's "To8»y theory."
Certainly the lengthy conmlti&eat of the Qnlted States in
Indochina seeims to be sooethii^ of a reversal of this theoiy; however.

hX subnit thAt Uiis complex ffiit£zigl«Bient his been strongl;^ InfXueoced
by Uie political and diplomatic rastrictioris mentioned earlier, I
believe theee factors are unique to t^ie uiQ}opular war alosie. Par-
adoxically, the Hmeiclc&n presence in this war has driven military
prestige even fui'ther do-vonfard and the press has freqiuaitly been the
vehicle of this descent.
In order to gain soBie insight into the bacis:groiind of the
relationship between the goverzment (nilitaxy) and the proas, research
nethodology was devised to Investigate it in a historical context.
Students of history are well snare that tlie fxstiire can societlsies be
more safely charted by api^Qying lessons learned froexi tne past, in
tiiis regard, it seeioed xieasonable to stiuiy press attitudes focusing
aa the United States arrisd forces in a critical jjeriod of oar history*
It was hoped that such a stu^y aagnx reveal infox^tation that eould
eaqilain^ to some d^ree^ the present coverage of the an^ed forces by
the press.
Fmipose and Scope of Study
Proceeding under the premise that American public opinion
toirard its az^o^ forces is reaching a dangerously Ion level and doRiaads
Investigation for improvenaent , it is the purpose of the quantitative
study to analyse the nat\ire and scope of press coimen^ (see ^^>esidix A)
toward the idlitaiy organlzaticai during a wartiiae period in United
States history. It is hoped that this research will initiate a series
of iBore cont«^>orciiy studies on tne socie basic those. In this loaxmer
. >J»
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a bro«kd picture of goverrffiient (military) -press relations might be
drawn over & neaningTul time »pan. The stutJIy is a content anelysis
of five infliiential .American dail^ ne¥arpa|:>ei'8 with special attention
to coiJBBent r^arding the United States axv.ed foixsea in a historical
context (1937-149)* Examination and analysis will shew Mxe quantitative
«Bount, direction and focus of this ctMnment as presented in these five
newspapers, Xhe atu^ attaspts to uncover valuetole historical back-
ground regarding the growth of Jimerican pi&llc attitude toward its
aisied forces. It specifically intends to investigate a considerable
segsiont of press corarrtent during a period ¥lien the military bec»T5.e
greatly involved in the Merican society' due to the Second World War
aiui the advent of the Cold V/ar.
The stud^ was pointed at a test of four hypotheses r^arding
newspaper editorial attitudes during this historical tiiae frame. It
was hypothesii&ed that:
I. Examiiuition will show the saonple of five new^apers fumishai
measurable differences among thentselves in lengthy niaift>er and
type of itaaoas Ccamwiting on milit&xy subj^ts.
XI. Journalistic cosam^nt generated about tlie arsied forces will
fld)ov a Enixed but gz^d^ial T^pt^ard tetulmicy in favor^leness
i>felle approaching V/orld Vlar II j followed by a revers&l and
therefore a dowiward trend after the end of the war. A
ta^cj^ary lowering of favorable attitude will be eaqpected
«bort3y after Pearl Ha2t>or, followed by a rapid upjKdng
tiiit>ugh the war, the post-war dasc^it will be most evident
in the late 19UO8 wh^i frequent inter-service quarreling
peaked over the establishsiRit of a Bepartmezit of Bef^eise SiXid
related issues.
HI. The five dailies chos^i wiU furnish sieasurable differences
awics^ themselves in direction of coaaent toward the s>TmA
forces*
^».'.' L 1/7 iJ
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I^. The focias (major emphasis or central theae with milltaiy
mplications) o£ oammit witiiin those xumrspapers will be
closely alignod.
The rvaainder of t^is chapter will include a discussion of
the significance of the project, a description of the sources to be
•used in the exaciination and defining the methodology to be used in the
study. Chapter XI w-ill briefly sumiaariae iarmed forces public relations
develc^paent froju the iaid-193C^ through 19h9 * Cliapters III, I\r and V
will be coneerncid individually with an eaq^lanation and analysis of
the three major areas of research interestoovolume, direction and
fccus. Chapter 71 will attecEpt to tie the sfeu*^ together in an
interpretive conclusion.
Significance
There continuM to be a need for additi<mal joumaliam research
in the are© of press-govennaent relations. Such studio may contrib-
ute to deeper knowledge axi^ better undez9tandir«g of the relationship
of these two gre&t forces in modem Aaeriean society. Within the
Ifedted States govonment since 1937, the lailitaiy organisation gradu-
el2y clir^jed to & position of great power and high risibility. This
visibility then has bt^n a caM|>arativaly recent devslopKent. The
historical struct^ire of the United States govemaaent through its
eerly years deliberately soijght to sioibjisgate tiie militaiy orgssiization
raider strong civilian control. The armed forces w«re therefore thrust
into the background of our sociarty until evmxta encoBinassing the
Seecnd World War caused the militaiy to rise to &n unfeiailiar position
d'•"MtJ-Aj
r-
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7of power within the American Bystmi. After both the Civil War and
World War I, the countiy sought to forget the tragedies of these
c<»iflicts by quickly demobilizir:^ the ainaed forces.
After the Second World War, three factors caused the nation
to accept the continoing presence of a sdlitery force that f&r out-
weighed anything the country had maintained in peacetime in the past.
These factors were? (1) poor prior preparation for two world wars
within 25 years, (2) tiie belligerency of the post-war communist
aovemeaot and (3) the developBient of atomic weaponry with the recog-
nition that it would not remain an exciiusive secret. And so the
ax)»ed forces grew, taking an ever^enlarging share of the nation's
tax dollar. Today there is an iziBoistakable cry frocfi the itoerican
people that there mist be a re~Grdering of national priorities con-
cerning the sp^idlng of that tax dollar.
Given the extro&ely dominant position of daily newspapers
over other ccffiimunication forms in the chosen time frame^ a press
analysis seeiued t^o offer the most fruitful meBim of examining media
influence on public opinicai toward the jailitary. This 8tu<i^ observed
only newspapers believed to have a strong iispact within a considerable
geographical area. Each is also located near one or more large
Kilitary installations and would be expected to ssxpress strong opinions
on nilitary matters.
These related factors? (1) the growth of the ssilitary role
in the Aaerican society since l^i?—especially financial, (2) the
iB^ortance of newspapers in helping the public uDdeinBtand its military
>?**¥««
6organisation—especiajUy regarding its perfoiroance in spwiding and
strategy and (3) a need for greater understanding between the military
and the press that may be aided by historical re8earch>-KhGn examined
together seem to reflect a gap in existing knowledge worthy of research
and significant to more contanporaiy study.
Sources
Scffiie of the most important indepaident variables germane to
the study were the newspapers chosen for analysis. Five large
metropolitan dailies were selected with two basic considerations in
mind. The considerations were: (1) geographical location and (2)
size of circulation. The lengthy time fraans chosen necessitated the
study being limited to five newspapers. Two research projects pre-
viously completed at the University of Wisconsin established the
validity of the first two considerations. Wendell J. Coats and
Steve W. Mulkey relied upon geograjdiical location and size of circu-
lation as their prisiaxy and secondary objective characteristics in
their plan to stratify and select a representative cross-section of
U.S. dailies in 19h9> Coats and Mulkey determined that there were
a total of nine characteristics necessary to obtain a meaningful
cross-section. George S. Pappas refined the Coats-Mulk^ procedure
in 1950 and found that onl^ two objective characteristics of the nine
listed in the Coats-Mulkey »tu<ty- had any major significance. These
were the two mentioned earlier—geographical location and size of
circxilation.
.- £LC <£
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9It should also bo stated that the ncMspapers were chosen with
an egre toward their influem;e &nd prestige. Those used were: the Hew
lork Times , the Washington Post , the Milwaukee Jouraal , the Chicago
Tribune , and the Los Angeles Times * Due to population concentrations
in the United States through the 1930s and l^UOs it was determined
that, in limiting the study to fire large daijy newspapers, two should
be taken from the populous Sast Coast area, two from representative
cities of the Great Lakes region and o£^ frcra the West Coast. The
choice of a Washingtcm^ D.C. daily was a coin^rciaise between the
desired second eastern journal and recognising "Uie need for scsne
southern represcmtation. Chicago and Milwaukee, althouj^ near one
another, are auLrtcedly different typw of uxisan centers.
Unlike the other three newspapers chosen » the New Xork Times
and Washington Post were not the largest circulation dailies in their
respective cities. The Editor £e Publisher International Ieaxt>ook
I im I •» ! I I n il I
Showed, howerer, that these morning dailies had veiy large and grox^ing
readex«hips throi^ the 19^08. The Times' weekday circulation had
Clicked to !^hl,269 and the Post's to 177,308 by 19U9* Sunday ciixu-
lation figures were much hi^er. The availability and evaitual
excellence of these newspapers led to their use in this stu^'. The
other three newspapers were the dominant dailies in their ristropolitan
areas based upon copies sold. Editor & Publisher showed the Los
Angeles Tiiaes (weekday - lil2,319) to be the best-selling daily on the
West Coast in 19ii9 and the Chicago Tribune (weekday - 982,238) in the
Ki<^est region. The Milwaukee Journal, the QxHy evening newspaper
^MrtJtfftwV «iSir ^
»np.
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u»ed^ had r»aeh«d a elroiilation of 309, liH; in 19U9 and was Wisconsin's
lazgsst dail^Y newspapsr.
Content anal^fBis studlas of this type frequently analyze ten
dallies in what has comm to be called the "prestige" press* Dtie to
the great amottnt of microfilm involved in this research^ it was limited
to a heavy sampling of only five of these prestigious dailies. The
Washington Post
,
Milwaukee Journal and Los ingelee fimes were building
toward positions of journalistic excellence through this time irsam,
Kone had^ at that time, achieved wide recognition as a member of the
prestige press. Obvious improveBiant in mature editorial polli^ was
noted in these dailies as the research progressed. Their pre3flnt*d£^
stature led to an interest in observing their earlier style and
conposition. 1£ later folloW'»on studies are generated 1^ this thesis,
the five newspapers inveati^ted will be easily adaptable to further
research involving the prestige press as acknowledged by contonporary
journalism scholars*
Villiaia L. Mvears eais^rttA two surveys of the Washington press
7
corps' attitude toward t*ie "prestige" press In 1!be 0pijaioisaakiK*9 »
The first survey analyzed the research of liSo Rosten in 1937 s the
second was called a "current survty" (1965>) . The doiainance of the
New York Tiraes was urviuestlon&ble. It remained the most heavil^^
relied upon and was judged the fair«it ziewspaper in both surveys. The
Washingtcm Post clirabed frosa ninth jx^sition in 1^37 to seventh in 1965.
The Milwaukee Journal was unlisted in 1937 and rose to ninth position
by 1965. The Chicago Tribune was unlisted in both surveys ^ however
ox
^:-». » v.
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nvaa mentioned (tenth position) as one of the "newspapers rea4 rt^gularly"
by txie press coips in Eosten's early survey. The Los i^iigeies Times
was not located in ai^ phase of either sunr<^. Its prestige status
night then be consider^ & recent develotindnt
.
Method
It vas decided that a large representative sample of each
newspaper during -Uie 13 y^axn of the 8tu<V i^ould offer a meaningful
test of the four hypothes^. Four months of each year were analyzed.
The months chosen were the first of ead:i quiarter (I.e., Januaxy,
J^m, July and October) ^ and all d^^ of the selected months were
observed for content. The camiesit coded involved three separate
types 1 editorials, letters to tae editor printed by the newspaper
and feature articles.
The original research design sou^t to eHminate the frailties
of 8yst«mtic sas^ling of the five Mnrspapersi however^ locating and
coding all available caionent over st)«h a lengU^ time sps^n was soon
recognised as too great a task for one student. It was then deten^jined
^tiat looking at the first month of each quarter of each je&r woujlci
produce a valid sample. A short inter*>9tudy comparison was accoK<-
pli^ed to test the soundness of this procedure « The coded resolts
of ccoBsent in a ccaaaplete year (15*37) of the Hew Xork Tisies Wei's lised
as a base. These figures vers cae^>ared s^ainst the four saaiple months
listed above. The results are shoim in Table 1.
In the interest of table brevity j only three parts of the
rMearch design were analysed. Thwie parts r^arding quantitative
a
12
Mtount, direction and focus were chosffiQ because they represent the
heart of the atud^. The figure ,333 was the ideal percentage »of\i^t.
Although the analysis showed some veakiwss in the amount (coliimn
inches) area, the coapariscai helped to establish the method as
reasonably sound.
TASSiS l.—New lorfc Times ecgataaoit on lailitary topics
(1 January - 31 Deceinber 1937)
Selected period
Complete year (Jan.j Apr.,
Jiily^ Oct.)
Percentage
Aiaouiit
(column indoles) Total 3U9U 7U8 aih
Direction of article
(1) Unfavorable
(2) Heutral
(3) Favojrable
Total
65
h
66
155
18
3
20H
.277
.750
.303
Focus of article
(1) Social
(2) Political
(3) Sccnaaie
(U) Leaderslxip
(5) Management
(6) Strategy
(7) CkaobinatiGa
Total
18
19
23
18
15
32
10
6
6
6
8
5
9
I
m
.333
.315
.269
.333
.281
.100
3S3
Further substantiation was sought for the method of using a
one BK>n.th sai^le to represmit each quaarter in the stud^. F. Jaiaes
Daris 9cad Lester W, Turner determined "that nonconsecutiTe saopleo of
erexy fUfth day or every sixth day are feasible for all ne-rfs categories
n9..1
X>
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ia iaw,«ricaa newspapers" in a oontant aaalyais dealing with crime neww
in 19$1, It follows logio£CUy that oveiy third-^ionth coverage would
be equally as valid as every fifth- or sixth^day coverage due to the
heaviex- eaBipling in the present atuii^. Editorial and feature ccaament
alio would seoBi to qualify ae "nwwi categories.'*
The coding unit used in the project was the article. It was
originally intended to code individual paragrajdisi however this unit
was discovered to be impractical wtwm the volume of material thc:.t
requii«d coding became clear early in the study. Host editorials,
letters and features involved a discernible the»© that was codsble
regarding amoimt, direction and focus.
First, the quantitative aaoimt of printed ecassaeat was recorded,
dtaadard coliasan inch roeasureraent was used (i.e.,. 176 to the eigiit
coluim page, 22 per individual coluam) . The New loiic Times pree^sted
a awall problem due to its editorial page »ake-up. The Times printed
a sev<m column wiitorial pagej therefore, these editorials were coded
at l.lli col«an inches for each standard coliasin inch measured. Sijrdlar
allowances were made for mry unorthodox page l^routs enxsountered <m
the five dailies.
Second, the direction of the article was coded. Three classi-
fication categories were ^teveloped (i.e., favorable, neutral and
unfavorable) . Operational definitions were developed for these
cat^ories (see Appendix A) . Few articles wei^e coded neutral because
the oooKent chosen for coding was usually opinionated in an obvious
direction. The operaticaial definitions used in coding direction
a'r'rii
\.mi
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were adapted frcara thos« mployed in a study by Richard W. Budd at the
University of Iowa/
Third, the major mj^haais or g«Mir«l thegjie of comment (i.e.,
focus) r^arding the militaiy in each unit was coded for analysis.
There were sev«n sab-categorieB used (see Appendix A) for this se^Bent
of the research. Artidea containing more than a single area of
«a|^aais were coded as "ccrabination."
The remainder of the infonaation coded consisted of the
identification of the newspaper, the date, section ajwi page -where the
coded aiticle could be locatedj the type of item and the direction of
the headline, photo(s) s.nd/or cartoon(s) involved with the so-ticle
(see j^pendlx B) . The wording of the headline for each article was
also recorded for ease in identification. Iho coaplete codii^ sheet
design is shown in Appeaipdlx B.
In order to obtain the quantitative data used in the exs^isia*
tion of the four hypotheses, the editorial pages or sections and the
Sunday suppleoients (e.g., magaxine, rotogravure, graphics, etc.) were
examined for each day of the selected months in «11 the sample news-
papers. Additi<mal feature articles were not sought due to the
excessive tiaa required to search whole newsp&pers for such consmwit.
Letters to the editor were always found on or adj&c«st to the prijaaiy
editorial page in each newspaper.
The test of Hypothesis I was a volume and item anaiij^sie
discussed in Cajapter III. The criteri«i used in measuring the asiount
of ccsiMNit devoted to military subjects were: (a) maaber of column
liX
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inches and (b) nmUbmr of itaos and (c) tjpd of iXmm, Individual
•ditorlal cartoons w«r« coded if occurring on th« editorial page or
within a feature article. Photographic featiirea (i.e., »ore than
one-half page in size or three or more photographs on the same eub*
Ject) were coded if occurring in tue Simde^ supplOBient. Single
j*iotographs were not coded. Onljr editorials found on the editorial
page or in the Sundsgr editorial section were coded.
The three "type of iton" categories (i.e., editorial, letter
to the editor and feature) vera utilised in order to present a more
balanced euoalgrsie than would hair@ been possible with th@ use of
editorials alo?^, Editorials were however the ma^or analjfsis cate-
gozy eov^t. Coding feature 8tori«» and note^ortl^ photographic
presentations allowed the stuc^ to include vhat these influesittial
asKw^papers believed were lailitary topics worti^y of "in-depth" report-
iDg« Such features were included because th€Qr were examples of
interpretive reporting. Straight editorials expressed opinion and
abbreviated tmajr of the "clarification axid ill\aaination** aspects of
interpretive writing foimd in feature articles. Coding letters to
the editor returned another distension to the volume analysis. It
reflected nhat the piiblic believed were militazy topics th&t deserved
ocenent. The stuc^ was llxaited in this area because it could only
analyse what each newspaper chose to print of this type of cosxaunica-
tion.
The testing of Hypotheses II and XXI was a directional analysis
discussed in Ch^ter 17. The attitudes of t^ five large dailies wei'e
i£
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gat]gad by tho favorable, nwitpsl or unfavorable direction of the
three iten categories a^^tloned above. The problssa of directionaUy
coding an entire it«s wae not a em&U one. H&ny individoaX editorials
vere written escpreesing both a s^ati^e and positive side to i»ericiin
military efforts—especially during the bitter defensive effort fou^t
by Acierican troops in 19U2 . Yet »ost could be coded;, as one priaiaiy
attitude was usueCUy predcadjiant. If no clear-cut decision could be
aade^ the iten iras coded "neutral.**
The test of Hypothesis II was shown on a chart in order to
clearly portris;^ how the newspapers exs^lnad collectively casmifiarted
on the azmed forces over the entire IJ'-yeax spectrum. This was a
test of the writer's "Torac^r tiieoiy." Further analysis (Hypothesis III)
showed how the selected dailies ccsupared ssnong themselves in the
direction of their cessment toward the ndlitaxy oz^anisiation. Headlinm
and graphic pres«ntations wexv also quantitatively studio in this
chfi^ter.
Hypothesis IV was a test of t^ focus (major ei^hasis or
cmtral theme) of ooesftent involving the azsied forces. How&z^ Loving
Mrt.ablished the use of •^focus" in a content analysis -Uiesis wh«n he
described his methodology in a recent study of the I969 French Presi-
11dential election. Loving observed prestige newspaper coverage and
whether individixal paragrap^is within iteias focused on the candidates}
or on the issiies. This study separates focus into sev«a g^ieral
categories (see Appm^ix A) i^re suitable fox* analysis.
All coded cc^ment vms examined to deten&ine which basic
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catc^ozy £onst»d the e«ntral thmm of ^tch item. As ±a directional
awQjrsis, the coding of focus d«velop©d one primaay difficulty: aoB»
it«DS included a oosibinaticHa of more thsn one of the categories. This
problflB^ occtirred in a onall perecnitage of the itosas \m9& and was coded
"combination," The deliberately broad definitions of the focus cate-
gories precluded the i^eed for an "other** catc^oxy.
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mm wcmm rmic HscAfions msnsumBm
It is laaafctory . . . that tha aimed foni«8 cr«at« ptitolic tmder-
standing of thair laiaaion. fio oyganiaatioa faeaa a stiffer,
contlnoiAg piblic raXstioas smaif^sa^t,^
Anowi fo3x«8 attitiadMi totrard nomsnen ha-ra prograaaed through
tlia T'aara fron isseoneem aia4 a lack ^ eoofperatloa to a tijm mskomh-
mdlpmit of the valtia of a favorabio prawi. In Effactiv® P\iblljc
Balstioaa, CutXip and Caatar relstad Um CivU War ixjcidant la uhlch
Qanaral GaoFga Maeda had a nauapapar eorraspondant maovad £rim emp
2
witla a Miffx raadlng "Libollar of tha Praas" ©around tlia jaan'a nack*
f. Donald ScovaO. wrota of tha graetli^g glvwa raportara by 1^© n&vy
99 tbay uttawptad t© cov«r & aijtoarljia aceidisit InvolYij^ tha B*h*
the wrltars h£d hlxed a tug to raach tha saXvaga aoana but \tem tumad
asray by Kavy fii* hoaaa. B^r tha pariod of thla sttid|y, hovairarj
adlltajty attitudaa had r«v9r9«& and tha samd aarvlcaa activa3y 8ca#ii
^a« iBadi&'s friendship* Tha first ha@d of tha Jkipasimmt of Dafanae,
^mam Forraatal, waa graatly «wara of i^ pavr of tha prase asjd ita
affect on public ©pinion. Tha aditora of Tha Forrastal Diariea saide
Forreatal wao kaenly aaoaitive to pixblic opinion«-sit tiisaa parhapa
orarsaoMiltiva. Ba foUowad it cloa«3^, was always in toach with
naiirapa{>axi««n and ccjsnantators, fillad hia filas «itfe f^^iclea aial
elippliigs that aaa»iad signif3x:szit to hia md p&M oonsidarabla
attantion to . . . public ralations.^^
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The traiisitional p«riod of this attitude change toward the prose took
place, to a great extent^ during the time frame of this 8ta<f^,
The Preirar Years
Axn&d. forces' public relations (PB) efforts were weak and
sporadic during the years leading into the Seeofid World War. The
Aitay, for «3can^e, placed its piablic relations function in its Militaiy
Intelligffiice Division (G-2). Witli seciirity of information SRiphasized
throughout the division, PR's potential to the Araiy w^ haadicatvpad.
As Sidney Kautson wrote: "It was . . . trus of this period that the
Azuqt's public relations machinsxy was not functioning to perfecti<m.
Perhaps if it had been a more enlightened PK program in 193^ the Army
aiiglit not have been in such dire straits in size, equipment and public
acceptance. ""^
Tlirough the saane tiiM period the Kavy was eocperiencing dif-
ficulties in its Public Relations Branch<-<»£l8o subordinate to an
intelligence section, the Office of Kaval Intelligence (QUI). The
8«oreta27 of the Havy, Claude Swanson, in a sMnorandum to all bureaus
and offices of the Mavy Departo&ant wrote:
The Public Relations Brsnch . . . has been asked by nei^spapei^BMn
froK tiiae to tiias to corroborate itesras of indisputable Havy
Oeparts^ant origin that have appeared in the press but >^ic^ have
not beoa cleared throu^ its press section.
Instances have occurred li^ere a reporter was ref\ised infoi^^atioat
by th© Public Relations Branch <m the advice of the bureau or
office concerned and subsequently an opposition paper obtained
the infozm&tion by establishing contact directly with an officer
or «B?>loyee of the bureau or office.
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Qvuah di^mrtures from the rogular procedure, iwhile aeldam 8«riou»
ii) tha»Belv«8^ t«nd to conprumiso tiie Mavy Departra^it * 8 triaehin^zy
for the simiiltaneoiis and impartial distribution of public infor-
mation ctxiceraing the Havy Departaaent and the naval »«rvice,°
The Earin« Corps d3.d not experience the degree of public
relations difficulty that its sister services esacoiontered frequently
through this period. Significantly, this branch of service never
attached PB to an intelligence function. The Corj>8 had recognised
early the value of a highly professional PE prograa in its World Mar I
recruiting efforts. Such a program continued into the time fraae of
this study. Spinning in 1936;^ Major General Ccaraaandajit Thoroas
HolcofiEtb directed an aggressive PR effort in his tenure as head of the
Corps. The resoorceful Sergeant Percy Webb was also greatly respon-
sible for 1^e Harines' popularity with newsnen. This colorful Karine,
through bis writiii^, was influential in molding his fellc«!? Regulars
7into a unit of high PE>consciousne8«« let even the Corps had an
occasional probl«a. Robert Lindsay wrote i
In Januazy, 1937 « HolC€»^, appar«itly as the result of some
intra-Headquarters funcling of press relations, issued a memo-
randum addresiMd to all dep&rtiaents and offices at Headquarters.
... he d«»anded that a stop be put to practices which resulted
in publication of iteias not cleared or released throu^ the
Public Eelatioas Section, or "fefoich resulted in disgruntled editors,
the victims of "beats'* by their opposition. 8
The Harine Corps sought to prosoote piiblic relations as the responsi<*
bility of each of its laesiibers and, in tlie words of on© of its postwar
public infoimation officers, did not have aaiy tyx>e of |>ublic infonaa-
o
tion organisation prior to World War 11.'^
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A major problttB which affected the PR efforts of each branch
of service through the prewar years was the lack of adequate manpower
to operate a stiwig program in Washington. The Aroy operated with
two officers and five civilians in Public Bolations Branch, Military
Intelligence Division (PBB, MID) during 1937.'^^'' The Mavy's PBB was
staffed by eight lailitary and civilian sr^ecialists, headed by a
Lieutenant Con»ander in the 1938-39 period. ^ The Marine Headquarters'
public relations efforts maintained close contact with the Navy PBB
through the late 19308, Marine PR offered another unique and effective
difference frtai the Am^ and Havy syetmrn. It worked closely with its
Recruiting Bureau in Philadelphia regarding press releases and photo-
graphs for the press. The Corps though^, for several ye^ra was
hindered by a lack of sufficient specialists assisting in press
relations.
Armed service leadei's were also quite aware at that tine of
the stigma attached to PR efforts aiaacicing of propaganda. The Aiwy
was especially concerned in avoiding »ai^thing that might by any
•JO
remote construction be considered as propaganda." A Marine re~
cruiter wrote in the 19314 Marine Corps Gasette t "In the preparation
of publicity, eiVQry care should be used to eliminate even a trace of
'Ballyhoo' or war propaganda.*' -^
As a rapidly expanding Anny and Havy approached World War II
,
it was recognized that a aore professional PB effort was necessary
to properly infona the public concerning vih&t the services were doing
with its sons and tax dollars. The military was unaccustoiBed to
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ineilca*8 ren0w@d interest after a i?eriod of more th&n two decades of
public apathy. Hundreds of thousaiids of young men were being mustered
into the armed forces, bringing the attenti<^ of their families &nd
friends with thwi. This new national attrition, added to earlier
snergencjr planning studies done by a Joint An^-Navy Public Relations
C<Maiiiittee (JANPEC) , raised public relations to the top level of mili-
tary iKienagenent before the war.
The An^ tr&nsferred the Public Belations Branch froa the
Intelligence Division to the Office of the 3)^uty Chief of Staff in
July, 19iiO. Qeneral Alexander Surles^ who in li?35 bad been appointed
by Gensrai Douglas ifecArthur to head the PEB, was given authorization
to greatly enlarge the bureau in January, l^itl. A new office, the
War I>epart»ient Bureau of Public Relations (WJD3K*R) , wa« formed under
the direction of an excellent organizer, Ma^or G«iergl Robert
Richardson III. General Richardson held tJie directorship of the new
Bureau for only six months before moving on to a new cormand. Surles
was ordered back to replace Richardson and remained the head of W2XEPE
through the war.
The Navy formally reproved public affairs fr<aa OKI and placed
it under the control of the Secretary of the Havy in April, 19iil.
The Secretaiy at that tirae was Frank Knox, former publisher of the
Chicago Daily Sews. Admiral Arthur Hepburn headed the new Office of
PwUblic Relations. With Europe at war and the navel service d^piy
involved in aiding Great Britain in the Atlantic, the Kavy PR effort
continued to grow and eiiierg^ney planning assisted increased ii&portanoe.
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The Marines established a PB division at He43dquarters in July,
19i4l. The organization vas responsible for both pxiblic relations and
all publicity, including that for recruiting. There was ao regular
press branch included in this new PR division. Everything in the way
1^
of spot news was handled by the Mavy Press Branch.
The War and Censorrtaip
Despite the limited nvsober of personnel involved^ the services
had the nucleus of a workable PE organisation when World War II broke.
Military information acquitted itself reasonably well as the war
progressed. let, one difficulty becane apparent early. The nature
of the PR function was bound closely to a problem eactraRiely hazardous
to smooth press relai,ions. That problem was censorship j, & procedure
considered & near necessity by mary military officers in a wartiiae
situation but one <teeply distrusted by noft^smen. There were sound
arguE&eiits both for and against the tightening of government (pre-
dceinately military) secrecy r^ulations. Arthur Krock^ writing in
his N«H lork Times column^ offered one of the most reasoned summaries
of the dilamma in Januazy^ 19ii2. He wrote t
This censorship ... is also a measure of the public safety.
and as a policy there can be no quarrel with it. Until or unless
concealment is used to shield official incompetence or weakness
of organisation, it is an essenti&l evil of wst. . , . Freedom
in its Bill of Bights definition having vanished for the duration
of the war^ it renains to be seem how greatly the restrictions
will affect those areas of information where censor and press mQ::^
honestly and patriotically differ over what will give aid to the
enosBy, and those items which are aimoying to officialdom rather
than of militaiy value to the foe,^
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Kavy censorship policies received the greatest amount of
unfavorable cceuwit directed at the armed forces by the media early
in the war. The sea service was forced into fighting an eactroiaeuLy
defensive struggle in the Pacific through most of 19l2. Anerioan
industry was not fully mobilized and the nation's major war effort
was directed at preparing to stop Eitler in Africa and Europe. As
a result, the Pacific war against Japan was fought primarily by a
Havy badly handicapped in supply and equipRent. This situation added
to the shock of the Pearl Haxiaor disaster arwL the very nature of
naval wurfare were factors contributing to the Navy's retic«mce to
disclose information.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt hlJBQself generated a principle,
following Pearl Harbor^ which the Havy used to back its information
policy of liiaited and late disclosure. The President's Director of
War Inforraation, Hmer Bavis, eiSi^l&ined the origin of l^e policy
when he wrote:
Preeidttit Roosevelt had laid down the principle in his press
conference of Oeceuber 9, 19UI th&t **war news, to be released,
must be true;, and must not give aid and ccoifort to the «neny."
He added, however that the decision as to whether it would give
aid and comfort to the ensn^ was up to the heads of the War and
Mavy Departanentsj which in the Savy D^arteent particularly,
meant the unifoxised heads of the axsed forces.^'
In naval warfai^ issues arose, particularly in connection
with the sinking of American warships in air-sea battles such as
Kidway and the Ck>ral Sea^ where no s^ip of either fleet ever saw an
warship. Haval air power was the primary offensive weapon used.
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In those actions It might be questioned x/hether the encn^ knew he had
sunk certain of our ships or not. Th® ^zvuxiuqq clalins were so wildly-
exaggerated as to be of little value as a guide* In the months after
Pe*rl Harbor, when fighting with limited forces, it beeaaie fina naval
policy that nothing would be released to the media that might tell
the en«B^ somethirjg he did not know.
Late disclosure of nsRral losses in the Solcason Islands created
« wer% ctf media anti«4lavy secrecy criticism in late 19u2 . A Scripps-
Howctrd Washington Daily Hews editorial illustrated the attitude of
nany isMtricans;
^y withholding news of ship losses frcssi 5 to 10 weeks—and by
still suppressing Pearl Harbor and Manila plane losses after
nearly a year—the Government is maicing the public a sucker for
natural fears and unchecked exaggeration, not to mention snosay
propaganda.^"
Such belated adiaission of losses at first concealed, inci^ased popular
distrust and led to the belief that the Kavy was withholding bad n«ws
merely because it was bad, or until it had good news to balance it.
This state of mind encouraged belief in wild rumors. It led to a
suspicion that not only the arraed forces but also the Roosevelt
administration felt that the people could not be trusted with infor-
xoation about events of the war. the effect on newsi^en and the public
was bad, no matter how good the original intention. A Haw York Tiioes
editorial illustrated liiecia fcalir^ /-yarding the goverzaaent informa«^
tion policy. It saids
;c' sj V-*?iJVii;7'>i
firi Su^
i '6L:2£
*»
>«j
>4
27
The probleaw of v&rtiiae censorship is s difficult one at best. . . ,
Official suppression tempered by unofficial revelation may lead to
the worst possible policy, which is to make public only the favor-
able facta . , , and suppress the unfavorable. Such a policy
would breed a false public confidence regarding our positicw and
then, vhen bad ntevs shattered Uila, would undermine the public
confidence Iji their Government's atatasients.l'^
^y the end of the war, tiie Mavy had made progress in clearing
its reputation as a highly cttssored news source. One important
eocasiple showed the change. The Chief of Kaval Operations, Adaiiral
£zKi68t J. King^ once strongly anti-press, became a respected back-
grounder for nofirauBen later in the conflict. This was confirmed in a
personal letter to this writer from a well-known public relatic^is
practitioneer^ Phelpa H, Mosjs. Adasks wrote:
During the WiO' I did have a f.xirly close association with Adteiral
Bmest J. Sing, ^o in the early days of the conflict was a
tax^et of Drew Pearson's snear ;^ob8, and vho had great distrust
of and contempt for^ the press., as a result. How that situation
was turned cotapletely around so that King became the press corps'
Bloat respected soxirce of confidential infonnation on the progress
of the war is ... a fascinating study. . , .^'^
The Aray also experienced scane difficulty with the press
regarding censorship. Suppression of the incident iirtiich involved the
striking of a hospitalized soldier by Oeneral Patton caused wctreme
discoaifort for the Arnsy when it was exposed by coluianist Drew Pearson.
Arthur Krock coiwiented on the incident t
In reluctant stages the 'wfar Departaent finally revealed that the
/FattonZ story was substantially correct , . . that the news had
Seen withheld because . . . lailitary considerations demanded it
and the newspaper correspcmdwita . . . had agre^. ^he incident
denoted a trend of field c<»RBJ&nders toward suppression . , , .^•*-
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The Arsny^s top lo&d«rshlp vas^ howevor, acutely aware o£ tbe
prohlmi and actively soiiglil a strong wai*ti]ra9 information pi'ogrtaa.
Secretary o£ War Henry Stiascai ttamm^d mi fustive ini'ereet in V#DBPE»
and placed it directly uiidsr his sxupervisiori in lyUl. The 3eoI^etaxy
recognised the pitfalls associated witii military seci-ecy and saidj
The Bi&jor difficulty in the Anty's pro»s relatione wa» the
necessity tor secrecy. Vlhil© it was easy to agree in pi'inciple,
th&t nothing useful to the enmay shoiild be made public , it vas
not alH&ys eas^ to detenoine in pr&ctice where the line should
be drawn. . . . Beyond certain limits secrecy became self*
defeating. . . .^^
The excellent directic^i of General Surles and Secretazy Stiffison*s
appreciation for a soxiiwi information effort resulted in a workable
relationship between WDBPE and the Office of Censorship and the
Office ol' War Infoz^ation (OWI). Knutson wrote j "In general,
relations were quite hanaoioniotas with /BUmerJ Davis /head of 0Wl7,
and especially so . . . with Bryan. Price and the office of Censor-
•hip." Kore insight into this relationship can be gained fay
#yaiBin.1 ng a letter written to Davis by George Creel. Creel was the
World W r I head of President Woodrow Wilson's Gcasaaittee of Public
laformation (CPI). Ci'eel wrotei
I 9m acre soriy then 1 can say that your control over Axmy,
Havy and State is not real in aziy sanse of the word. I know
adoirals and generads, also Sutaner Welles, aiitd vtiile you may
think you have established an arrangement that will pen&it a
free flow of the nti^ws, jusi wait until an issue arises. The
whole succiMis of the CPI was due to the fact that neither the
Army nor the i*av;y h«id the right to sit in arbitrary jujd^i&at
on what should or should not be printed. Time after time they
disputed my authorit-y, aad I won out only because Woodrow Wilson
li , t'n - r,i
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hann^rod th«R do-wn. "Coordination by conference" nov©r worked
and oeTer will woric.^^
Davis wrota in the margin of this letter « "he w&a about rigat on all
points S. D."
As the itf&r progreaaed more favorably for the itoerican ajnaed
forces^ censorship eased. Nevemem becaa^ae i^ore satisfied with militaxy
iofonaEition efforts. The developing air service, imder General H. H.
Arnold, clearly saw the dividends of effective public relations,
Ksrly in the conflict , the AMurican peoples racognized the strength of
air power and were receptive to favorable publicity on its beiialf
.
Such growing acceptance occasionally ca^e at the expense of the Am^y
&nd Navy «hich had temporarily lost considerable public confidence
due to onpreparedness at Pearl Harbor. The Hew Tork Times saidj
'•The roan in the street h&s been quicker than the old-liiie admirals
and gwiersla to recognise the doiainant role of air power in the
present war." "^ In addition, the Air Corps had recruited many skilled
PR and advertising men as the war started. These specialists beeane
vezy valuable in promoting the Air Force as a separate branch of
service—a campaign that reaped dividends in 19h7
,
The Postwar Te«rs
Armed forces public relations matured further in the years
after World War II despite personnel cutbacks. The function was
used extensively to assist the military in str«jgthening its forces
in the face of a belligerent Eussian cold war strategy. The services
sought public support for money and manpower progreEiS. Personnel
"i&r,,, Hi
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strength had diminished at a rapid rate with the close of the war aa
the Ataerican people exerted msxijBun pressiire to bring their fighting
Mm hone. iUi & result, top military leaders sought a strong infor<-
mation effort to rally public oDinion in recognizing the nMd for
sustained interest in national security.
The writings of Knutscn and Lindsay led the reader to beliere
that postwar public relations specialists, in theory, etrnbraced the
ccoicept of open disclosiire of in£'orm£^tion to the public end attonpted
to sell this idea to senior ailitazy policy-makers. These specialists
became steadily nore professional as they realised that there was a
need and a responsibility for informing the public of an&ed services*
activities in both war and peace.
There wcs also evidence that part of the inerican press
supported a strong postwar military PR prograea. Linda&y quoted a
Hcmolulu Mvertiser editorial which saidt
There hes been built up during World War II a large efficient
public infonaation, or public relations, branch, for each of the
axmed forces. These should not be eliminated when the war ends,
but, trinaaed to appropriate sise, should be maintained with the
same r^ognition of their importance. . . .^^
The Army continued to re-«nraluate and shift its infomtation
function after the wsr. The office finally settled under the Deputy
Chief of Staff and was leaded by a Chief of Information with the rank
of general. It was primarily through the news branch of this division
that the Ar»y conducted its press relations throu|^ the rejaaining
years of the time frame involved in the study. Its efforts were
oo
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fiUDdanentally soimd and unspectaciil&r.
Havy laforaatlon efforts lagged somewhat bi^lnd those of the
other branches of the senrice in the late 19UOs. Charles I*arson
i»plied that the difficialty was not with Navy PR specialists but was
to be found in the attitude of maiigr Navy line officers Vfho lacked a
sound laiderstanding of the role of imblic relations.'' This situa-
tion say h&Te contributed to the absence of press aooeptance for the
Kavy*s position in the &x»ed forces unification quarrel of this time
period. The Milwaukee Journal ex«g^lified this lack of support in a
19ii9 editorial entitled, *ni<ho'e Sinking the Savy." It s&id«
The Kavy^ or its high conffiand^ seems to be acting like & spoiled
child.
Certainly, by its stubborn opposition to the unification prognaa,
and the conspiratorial and melodraiaatic activities in ccanection
therewith, it is proving lOC^ right the task force of the Hoover
eonsission when it saidi
"Public displays of interservice friction have often gone b^ond
t^e boun«ki of healthy rivalry. To the average citizen most of
th«i seen childish. "^^
The Air Force was very well accepted by the press after the
war as it continued to capitalize on the fine reputation it had
gained by its contribution to the allied victory. Its PR was con-
sist«Qtly good and widespread, A lew York Tiroes editorial ^ "The Air
Force Scores Again," for exa^le, lauded the air service for its
successful Megro and white integration at Lackland Air Force Base in
Texas. The Times wrote:
I UJHi mv nx wiJj. «
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The viiite and Kegro men . . . ccosprisli^ the pezvaanwit peraonnel
at the base innediately began living, eating and training togftther
in complete harraony. . . . The Air Force carried out the /Inte-
grate? order and did it eoBmeadably.^^
^
The Lo3 Angeles Timea also reflected the goodwill of Air Force PE by-
writing j
The Air Force was quick to act when The Tiiries revealed intolerable
living conditions and low morale at iis super«secret desert test
base at Huroc /Califomiaj. It set a laudable example for all
militazy functionaries by accepting the inforBiation in the spirit
in i^ich it was given and taking steps to set conditions aright.
. . .Not the least of /the base consKandar's? improvements is his
reversal of the aalightened "public inforaaTion" policy at Mur«M5.
Bona fide newsaien are no longer to be barred frtm the base but will
be welcome anywhere. . . .3'^
Liadstgr maintained that Haz^e Corps PR activity after the war
was hi^ily professional and successful. Although the Corps opposed
the ajn^d forces salification bill of 19hy due to the possible lose of
its Jealously guarded amphibious warfare mission; its Cosa»andant;
CNmeral Vandegrift, aade a forthright stateeient explaining this atti-
tude but also conveying clearly the Marines' Intention to abide by
31
the will of the people. The Marines wisely avoided the controveragr
and poor publicity that had marked the Havy opposition. This skillful
handling of a delicate and hi^ly SBiotional issue by the Corps showed
the unnistakable mark of enlightened PR doctrine—a mark reaching to
the very top of its leadership.
It can therefore be seen that the public relations efforts of
the azAed services progrtssstgd from an operation of limited effective-
ness to one of considerable eaqpertise within the tiKie frame of this
St
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study. Only the Navy effort seemed marginal by 19h9» Such efforts
must have had some significance in influencing press attitudes toward
the military. It is these attitudes as e^cpressed throi^h the editorial
and feature sectior^ of leading metropolitan dailies of the time that
will be analyzed in the next three chapters.
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THE VOLQMB A»AV[Q13
Quantitative analysos are . . . gratuitous i^ten the aiBnber of
cases Is sniall. ... As the date b&coBie more numerous, ho^jever^
a systwiatic arrangiment of then becoses the laore desirable.^
The test of Rypothesis I analyzed the sraotmt and type of
Bilitaxy CGDnaent found in the five influential dailies stut^ed. It
was hypothesized that these newspapers woiild reveal measurable dif-
ferences among th«nselves in length, number and type of it^nss ccan-
ffienting on military subjects* As will be ssen, this l[]Qrpothesi8 was
confin&ed conclusively within the sasiple used*
The Washington Post
It was detenaiiied that the Washington Post led the other
four dailies in both total number and overall length of iteeis com-
mwnting on military-related subjects (see Table 3 and h, pages h^
and h6) . The Post carried 26 percent of the total coisi&^at analyst
in the research (see Table 2, page Ui). This Washington dai:3^ also
led the others in both total editorials and letters to the editor
(see Tables $ through 9i pages hi throu^ $1),
The Post's leadership seemed attributable to several factors.
First, it printed one and one-half to two pages of carjjient dai3y. The
other study newspapers generally liadied ccameait to a single page
exc^t on Sundays. Second, it devoted a large amount of daily editorial
36
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apace to ayndicaled coliaanist* (<t«g* Walter LippRiann, Bamet Ncfver,
Smeat Lindley, Karquls Chllds, WestbrooK Pegier and ox^hers) throtigh
tba time frame of the stu<fy. These writers frequently wrote on Biili-
%sxy aubjacts. Third, this newspaper also cazTied a Sunday anned
forces feature page during the prewar years. This page was added to
the routine Sundcty la&gazine and picture feature sections which were
printed by each of the five dailies examined. The feature page,
bowenrer, was dropped after World War II broke out. Table $, page kit
clearly ahows the militaiy feature emphasis found in the prewar Post .
These factora aaera to have influ^ieed the Post's volui^Ae leadership in
this stiu^.
This newspaper's nearness to high-ranking military officials
in "Uie nation's capital lai^t also be regarded as contributing to the
Post's statistical edge in the research findings* Washington D.C.
airaa military sources bec^iQue extrooiely valuable to nevsmen within the
chosen tijae fraae and the Poat^s editorial and feature writing re-
flected the newspaper's recognition of that fact. E3q>andii^ a«aed
forces infoiroation efforts, as disciissed in the previous chapter^
ai^t also have contributed to inci^ased Post ccsiament concerning the
I6ilit&.iy«
The Post used graphics in ma^jr of its arroed forces articles
prior to the war. Photographs and editorial cartoons were often an
important part of editorial and feature presentations. Thro^lgh the
war ye&rs and into the postwar period this policy saeaed to change.
Ttoa iBAjority of ccamrient on military topics shifted to editorials and
Yt
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away from photographic features and editorial cartoons.
The Hew York Tiiaeg
Analyzing the New York T lines data also revealed a large volione
of military caataaent between 1937 and 19149 . The Times contributed 23.2
percent of the jaaterial found in the ctssipleted sarcple (see Table 2,
page kh) 3 «nd finished second in moat aspects of the volume an&lysis.
Thia prefftigioiis New York daily would have undoubtedly been the volume
leader in the study exc^}t for the newspaper's policy of not printing
the cowEient of syndicated columnists on its editorial page. The Times
procedure in expressing opinion x^as unvarying, huch of its comment
was found in its lengthy editorial section in the Sunday edition.
Additional featui^e articles were found in the Hew York TiPies Magazine
which also printed on Simdsy. CoFLnient daring the rana3.nder of the
week was liiaited to short iteaias found on a daily single editorial
psge.
The Times eiaisloyed a highly-respected r^orter for much of its
military affairs writing. This specialist was Hanson Baldwin, a Naval
kcidmsy graduate. Baldwin wrote in-depth and interpretive feature
articles appearing frequently in the Sunday editorial sectirai or the
New York Times Magazine . Table $, page U?, shows that this journal
printed more editorials than features or letters to the editor. Yet
Times' featujre articles were found to occupy three times the amount of
editorial space and over 12 tiRnes that filled by letters to the editor.
Despite placing second to the Hilwauk^ ^lourn&l in total number of
uc
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featur«»s printed within the study, the colxjssin inches ccaaprising Tljnett'
Ji©at\u*o writing led similar coniKent in the other four newspapers.
This infonitation was veriXied in the ccaaplete data analysis but was
not included in a t&bl© fomiat.
The Chie^igo Tribune
The research deteimined that the Chicago Tribune
,
published by
the militaiy-rainded Colonel Robert McCoiroick, printed 18,3 percent of
the total railiteiy comiaent entering the study (see Table 2, page 1^^)
,
McCormick's large Midwest daily was third in both the it«:a and vo1tse«
anfOLysis (see Tables 3 and h, pages IS and Ub) , The Tribune ?^lso did
not use syndicated coltsmists on its editorial page.
This Republican Chicago daily igas well-icnowa for its strong
isolationist attitude during the study's tinie frasie. The newspaper
was strongly agaiiist the Mew Beal and relentless in its attacks on
Presidwit Roosevelt and his policies. The Tribune editorial policy
is mentioned briefly here because this attitude seerried to affect ^s
Journal's comment regarding the armed forces and will be discussed in
Chapter IV. McCormick's staff also made the editorial cartoon a
powerful instrument in aaphaaizing the publisher's opinions. The
Tribune printed a single editorial page seven days per week and did
not present a section of opinion in its Sunday edition. Sunday photo
and news magazine military features were evidsnt but not numerous.
It was noted however that the Tribune wrote more ©ditorliils concerning
the armed forces in the late 1930s than any of the other dailies in
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the 6tud^ (3G0 Tables ^ through 9, pages 1^7 throiigh >1).
The Los Angelea Tlmea
The Los Angeles Times comment on military topics wo4B veiy
liinitod in the yesrs leading to the war; but beginning in 19i;2, the
anaed services became iftuch more visible in this large Wast Coast
journal (see Table 8, page bO) . The Times contributed 17.2 percait of
the study's coded items (see Table 2, page uU). In the late l?30s
this Los Angeles newspaper used a single editorial page. By the late
l?I;Os the TiTiies had expanded to a second page of opinion.
Editorial cartoons were used in the Times to a moderate degree
but not with the impact of those suppoiiiiag editorial policy in the
outspoken Chicago Tribune . S\ich graphic editorializing rarely in-
volved jailitsiry subject matter in this Los Angeles newspaper.
The Tijaeg j in the early years of the studj*-^ seined to be both
"Hollywood" and "3ensa.tionalisiB"-ori8rit8d. Its early attitude toward
the United States anaed forces was frieiidly both before and during
World sJar II. By tiie late I9U0& this attitude had changed noticeably
as tiie Times sought a role 01 increased social responsibility and a
more questioning editorial policy.
The Milwaukee Journal
The Mili^^r-ukee Journal stood last ai&ong the five dailies in
both item numbers snd coliimn inciies of military comment. It carried
15.3 percent of the opinion anslyzed in the research (see Table 2,
page UU).
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The large Vvisccnsln daily iJiot-e little coivanent about the
country's military forces until IJ^Uo. The stu<ty showed that in the
next ten years the Journal became much more interested in the defense
establishment, especially in the area of editorial writing (see Table
^i page $1).
The Journal led the entire stu(^ in total number of feature
articles. The reason seoried to lie in its editorial page make-up.
Although offering only a single page of daily comment to its readers,
the Journal printed a feature article of approximately 6o column
inches on this editorial page nearly each day. In addition, the news-
paper offered a Sunday news magazine supplesment which produced &a.
occasional military feature.
The Journal often used an editorial cartoon on its front page
but later relocated it to the editorial page. Few of these cartoons
involved the aimed services over the 13-year time period of the study.
Summary
The vol\ime ani'lysis served to clarify some additional points
concerning military ccanment, expressed by the five newspapers selected
for the resesrch. Such coBurient rose frcan a generally low level in the
early portion of the study to a peak during the war years. Following
the conflict, as exj>ectedj this number diminished. Newspaper comment,
however, never again fell to the level of the prewar period during
which the press paid little attention to the United States militaj^r
organization. It may be significant that military infonaation programs
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generally soorjed to improve in «ap»rtiso and tlierefore helped to
incroa»« azned farces visibility through the same period. This im-
prov«Kiant was seen in Chapter II. Certainly the war itself and the
events involved in Uia Cold War were prime factors in this increased
visibility, yet the aafilysis evidence opens the possibility of infor-
B&ticsi efforts also being a factor. It should be noted that this
trend was net entirely consistent ^en carried over to the coliann
inches aspect of the volume analysis. When C0E5)aring the years 1937-39
with 19li7-l49, the Washington Post , tl-ie Hew lork Tiiaes and the Chicago
Tribune printed more coliaan inches, but fewer articles, in the esxlier
period.
In this stuid^ the daily with the smallest circulation, the
Washington Post (see Chapter I) , outdistanced the much larger and more
prestigious New York Tiioes in total lailitaiy coiaaent. The Post's
use of a large editorial input by syndicated colurrinists appeared to
be the greatest contidbuting factor in causing this scaaewhat uijexpected
result. It might also be noted that the Post , like the New Yortc Tiiries ,
ee^loyed a specialisied milltaxy repoi^ter, John Q. Norris, whose writing
made up a laxge portion of the newspaper's numerous prewar militaiy
feature articles.
Hypothesis I was confiraiod. For exajsiple, the range of dif-
ference between Washington Post inilitaiy cowaent and that of the
Kilwaukee Journal was 10.7 perc«it in the itsEi analysis and 13,
7
percent in the coluBai inches analysis (see Table 2^ page kU) * Again
comparing the saxfie newspapers, it was seen that the Post printed
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nearly twice the number of column inches of militaiy camcient «b
published by the Joum^.1 . The tables disclosed similar vride varia-
tions betx^een the five journals in type of itoa ccsacentration. These
are significant difference when using the saKie saa^l© procedure with
all newspapers over an identical time £r8m&»
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(»APTE» IV
THE DIRECTIOMAL AKALISIS
/T quantitative analysis? establishas how many examples there
are to suppoirt each side of the argument and thus reveals not
only the main featui-es of the evidence but also^ more tniportant,
the exceptions to th^n, the nuances, the degree to wriich the
emerging generaXlaationo need to be cualified.^
The test of Hypotheses II and III an8ly25ed the directional
aspect of comment about tiie military found in the five influential
dailies studied. It was first hypothesized that the corirnent in
these dailies would show & mij^ed but gradual upward tendency in
favorableness while appro&ching uorld V.ar II, follOTred by a reversal
and therefore a downward trend aTter the war. A tenporary loxfering
of favorable attitude was predicted soon after Pearl Harbor^ followed
by a rapid upswing through the conflict. The predicxed postwar drop
in favor was forecast to reach an extrersely low level with the
inter-service struggle over the establishment of a Bepftrtment of
Defense in the late 19U0s. A second hypotiieeia predxcied that the
five chosen newspapers would furnish jaeasui-abl?^ differences aptong
themselves in direction of coBUTient regarding the arified forces.
Hypothesis II was generally confirmed in both the wartime and
postw&r periods; however, it was not confirmed in the prewar years.
The prewar period was strongly mixed with an actual downwr-rd trend
in favorability in all five newspapers during the 1935-Uo segaient.
Hypothesis III was confinaed. This was particularly evident in the
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wide difference noted in the directional analysis of the Chicago
Tribune conmient as corapared to that of the other four journals.
These conclusions can be seen more clearly in Figure 1,
The directional analysis represented tiie heart of the infor-
mation sought in this content study. As a result ^ a meaningful
statistical test was deteiTuined to be necessary to further establish
the validity of the figures acquired tiirough the sampling procedure
2
used. The Chi-square (X ) test seemed to offer a sound method for
2
examination of the nominal data obtained. This test was used on
each of the five newspapers of the study. The coded data in t>\e
three directional categories (i.e., favorable, neutral and unfavor-
able) for each newspaper was further separated into wartime and
non-wartime contexts. The Chi-square test was then done to coiapare
the axpected and observed frequencies in both contexts. The null
hypothesis was rejected for each of the study newspapers. In each
case,, tne observed data v?-:.a found to bo statj.sticaU.y significeiit
with a probability for error (p) of less than one chance in 1,000
using a constant two degrees of freedom (see Tables 10 through Ik)
The Washington Post
Washington Post coitmient toysbi^ the military for the complete
study time frssie was found tc be ^8.7 percent favorable (see Table
1$). This newspaper traced a varying but basically favorable pattern
in its prewar comment regarding the armed forces. This pattern
ranged from a 79 percent prewar height of fsvorability in 19hl to a
^2 percent low in 1938. The Post ' s wax-time military comment rose to
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XAHJB 10.--A Chi-8cu«re teat ccanpariaon involving tisre© directional
catteries in a wartiirie versus non-wjii-time context for the
Washington Post
Obsei^ed
Total
Expected
Wartiffie Non-wartime Wartine Non-wartime
Favorable
Heutral
Unfavorable
6ii.7$;
9-8
25.5
I6.9jt
9.0
Ui.l
1)86
8Ii
312
53.55t
9.2
37.5
53.3)t
37.5
100, Ojl
n - 3?6
100, ()5g
n = 586
912 lOCuOSt
n = 326 n ' 586
A (war vs. non-tjar) =' 32.30 p ^ <,.001 t'/n - .035
TABLB 11. --A Chi-stiuare test coa^jarison involving three direjctiozial
categories in a wartime veisus non-wartime context for the
New lork Tlo^s
Observed
Total
Expected
WartLiie Non-wartinie Wartime Non-wartime
Favorable
Neatr&l
Unfavorable
72.3^
11.6
16.1
56,5^
7.6
517
77
210
6)4. 3:^
9.6
26.1
a. 3^
9.6
26.1
100.056
n « 397
.
100, 05^
n - U07
801* 100. 0?f
n - 397
10(3. 05t
n - ii07
X" (war vs. non-war) « lii.l2 p « <,,OiJl X^/n - .017

$7
TABLE 12.—A Chi-scuare test comparison involving throe di.rectional
ciitagoriGS in a wiortiae versus non-W£.rtijae context for the
Ciiicago Tribune
Obsei"ved
Total
Expected
Wartime Non-vr&rtime Wartime Son-wartiEi®
Favorable
Xeutral
Unfavorable
hQ,b%
6.9
a.
3
33.5;^
5.7
6(3.8
250
39
3U5
39,h%
6.1
39.U^
6.1
100.0^
n * 2ii6
10C».0$
n « 388
63U 100. Q5K
n - 2U6
2JX.0%
n « 388
2
I (war vs. non-war) = 16.81; P <. 001 x"7n = .026
TABLS 13.
—
A Chi-aquaare test ccatiparison involving three directional
categories in a wartime versus non-wartiBie context for the
Los Angeles Tijaes
Observed
Total
S^qpected
Wartime Non-wartime Wartline Non^wartisie
Favorable 71. 65!
Meutral 11.14
Unfavorable lU.O
9.6
33.8
378
70
1U8
63.k%
U.?
2U.9
63.1i^
11.7
2h.9
100.0%
n = 271
yjo.Q%
n - 32$
596 100.056
n « 271
10J. 0^
n - 325
X (war vs. non-war) = 31.57 p - <,,CX)1 if/n - ,0$3
)9
B%
d
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TABX£ lli«—^A Chi-square test ecn^arison involving three directional
categories in a wartime versus non-wartiiae context for the
Kilwaukee Journal
Observed
Total
Expected
irfartiiae Non-wsi'tiBie WartJune Hon-wartime
Favorable 73'.?JS $5.1% 338 63.2^ 63.2^
Neutral S.l 6.3 \^ 8.6 8.6
Unfavorable 15.0 36.0 151 28,2 28.2
100.C^ la.o^ 535 100.(^ IOj.O^
n ' 199 n - 336 n - 199 n = 336
2
I (war vs. non^war) ^- 27.61 p - <..001 2^/n = .051
ivi u.de
it
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86 percent fsvorable in 19hU then dropped away lapidly to postwar lows
of 33 percent iii both 15'l46 «ind 19ii9. The heayiest volwae of favorable
coBuaent was eeen in the war years 19i;3-U5. The heaviest volume of
xmfavorable ccsfflaent was noted in 15?U6.
TiBIil l5***An itec; directional analysis of all covimant coded for tkx9
Washington Post by year (1937-1*5')*
Fevor&ble Neutral Unfavorable
Number Percent It-usiiber Percent Number Percent
1937 27 5.6 2 2.ii 19 5.6
1938 2k h.9 7 8.3 21 6.1
1939 31 6M 3 3.6 9 2.6
19iiO Ui 9.1 3 3.6 31 9.0
i9ia 37 7.6 11 13.1 10 2.9
19'h^- ii8 9.9 II4 16.7 32 9.1
19h3 58 11.9 9 10.7 2$ 7.3
19iili 60 12.3 6 7.1 10 2.9
19Ui)' 60 12,3 9 10.7 30 8.8
19U6 29 6.C 3 3.6 57 16.7
19li7 26 5.3 6 7.1 17 5.0
I9I48 15 3.1
>
i4 ii.8 28 8.2
19u9 27 5.6 7 e.3 53 15.5
Total x86 lOti.O Qk 100.0 312 100.0
The overall percentage of favorability of military coianient
found in the Post in the stu<fy time frame was 58.7 ' This percentage
computation discarded all cceaaont ceded "KEUTRAL*"
The Post's prswer ccaament s^out the Aiserican ai'med services
was mixed. It was exflgs^lified in a 19U0 column written by Bamet
Never . He wrote:
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. . . The history of deciocratic nations at var h&& tended to
Confinn the popiilar democretic belief tbat civilian control of
military affaire is essential to natlonfel welfare, . . .
On the other hand, there are else many c&ses where Use ciTilian
control of lailiti-iry affairs had a deleterious effect on the conduct
of war.
... In a vei'-y tajuely article on "Civilir.Ji Control of Kilitaiy
Policy^' in t.)c" cui-rent issue of Foreign Affairs Lindsay Kogers
SiLkQB the excellent point that a~c^i)i"yt minister "must be E»ore
ti.an the uncoiupr-oiiendiag mouthpiece of a chief of staff or war
lord," As Cl&'.ienceo.ii said, "war is saich too ier^ortant a biisiness
to be left to the soldiers." Yet neither can it be left wholly
to the civilians.
3
StatesBien and soldiers r.iust cogploment e&ch other.
The fluctiiating pattern of Post pi'cwar lailitary comirjent is plainly
STident in Figure 1.
k marked irwrewtse in favorable ccxiiKient we« uruuistakable during
tiie war. The Post frecuently praised ti e efforts of Anericaa troops
even in defeat. A 1912 editorisl entitled, "Spirit of Bataan^" saidt
. . . li* ABericams are worthy of their traditions, this exasiplo
of courage, fortitude and tenacity in the face of overwhelming
odds Eiay prove to be of even greater significi^nce ti .in tlio losses
of time, equi.pirient and men. ... if all Auierica is actuated by
tt-iC Spirit of Bataanj victory cannot be denied us.^
The postwar period saw a rapid change of direction in Post
militaiy cor^ent. The raajority of this coFiiaent between 19l;6-U>' was
unfavorable. Post colusanist, iUiiest LiJidley, writing just prior to
the Js?)anese surrender in Ju3y, 19^5', foresaw a reversal of press
attitude after, the war. He wi'ote:
, , . during the war tne general tendency has been to "go ©as^"
in ci'iticizing the brass hats.
fll
•c. -if.
-J^lA/r. .,.a9 At
.-x^v crfi
iv. ivoim
j«
61
Man;^ of the higher officers in the armed senricoSj have beon
wor^irig for more than h 1/2 yesrs beidnd teisporary safegivirde
.
Soma of their decisions have beon screened hy canaorehip. The
cenaorship i-ulos were a necessary soXeguard to our security.
But tuey have also protected, to soBie extent, officers who laade
mistakes
,
. . . publicly the professionals have not beon subjected to the
close acinitiny and free criticiSTu VRiich they can expect in
pe^.cetxiue. They have been living in ter!f)orary hot houses. Sara*
of tiiem havo becraae so accustcaaed to it that they luay find it
hard to readjust tnoBiselves to tne rigors of qpen examination
and public criticisiii. . . .5
Lindley's statement signaled the beginning of this change of
attitude in the Post . A condition that the press called the ''lEilit&ry
mind" became the object of Post criticiaBa in I9I46, In January, 19L6,
a Post editorial said. ", . . the lailitary mind has always been
conteiuptuous of constitutions and parliaments," The Navy, siiffering
froiR an ineffective ?E effort in the late 19hOB as seen in Chaptei' II,
received pai'ticularly unfavorable coKEaent in the postwar Post . A
7
I5U6 editorifl spoke of "antidiluvian el<«ients in the Havy" ythen
discussing t'ne opposition of the sea service to the proposed armed
forces' unification issue.
The New York Timea
The New Xork TJBxes military coisB»nt was 71.1 percent favorable
in the stud^' sairple (see Tablo 16), The research revealed that the
TijEiejB never dropped below ^0 percent favorability toward the military
in ax^ year of the study. It was the only r^wapaper of the five
analyzed to have this distinction. The Times* prewar military writing
was consistently rieai' 60 percent favorebi3J.ty, The nm^-spaper's
wartime cessment Wf^s strongly favorable, reaching a high nark of 96
I. «t nf ; f 1. r i III? '5 ' f J .. 1. ,i fc - •. J
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percent in l^ijlt. Th« predicted postwar drop was evident as the Times
'
coDicient again returned to an approximate 6c percent level of favor-
^ility (see ^igui*© 1).
TABLE 15,—An itess directional analysia of all coirffiient coded for th«
New York Times by year (19^7-1x9)*
Favorable Neutral Unfavorable
Nimbei- Percent Number Perceait Number Percent
1?37 4- Vu. 3.9 3 3.y 18 8,6
1S^38 22 U.3 2 2.6 XL 5.2
193? 33 6,k I 5.2 17 8.1
19hO 2ii ii.6 6 7.7 19 9.0
1911 30 5.8 1 1.3 17 8.1
1!?12 58 11.2 U 18.2 hb 21.9
19ii3 a6 16.6 10 13.0 8 3.8
X9iilj 82 16.0 15 19.5 3 l.l
lyl5 73 ll-.l 7 y.l 11 5.2
1916 16 3.1 1 1.3 16 7.7
19i)7 2U h 5.2 17 8.1
19i;8 2U li.6 7 9.1 11 5.2
19h9 25 U.8 3 3.9 16 7.7
Total 517 100.0 77 10*5.0 lie 100.0
The overall percentage of fsvorebility of srxilit&ry coiaBsxent
found in the Tiraes in the stu^ time frasj:*© was 71.1 . This peitsentage
coaputation discarded all corament coded '*HEUTHAL.''
In the years leading to World War 11. Ne«' York Times ccsjiment
•mphasiaed tiie growing strength of the Mericsn military but did not
speak highly of its abilities. An Aprils 19lil editorial said, ". . .
We are building a rrsas© ensiy, but we have not yet achieved an anigr of
It
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higii quality,"
The Tira«8' military coBOi^nt dropped in favorability early in
I9U2 as tiiQ Aimy and Navy were criticized for corfiplaceiicy and incom-
petence at Pearl Harbor, ground leases in tne Philippines and ahij^irig
losses in tu6 Atlantic. Yet the newspspar c..w. not aorapletely atop
backing tne anaed foi-^cos. A reader letter appearing in a January
.
I9i£ edition snowed that the Timea would not be shaken into printing
proda;iinato3y iinfavorable attaclca on the militaxy at that cnicial
tiiae. The letter said;
... I ahall "Reraexiiber Pearl Harbor j" but not aa a dreadful
oxsaple of Jap^'neee troachery and most certainly not as a blot
on tl e record of the an?ied forces of the United States, I
ahall reii^jibei' Peerl Harbor as a -nonunient to ti-^e capacity of
too mar^ of r<^ fellow-countrymen for coi^lacancy, hypocrisy and
self-deception . ^>^
Xttttsr in the conflict^ the Ijiaes staunchly 3i]|>poit0d "Uie anried forc»i,
A l9hU editorial entitled, '^A Day For The Arssy," illujetrf;ted tiiis
support and also revealed coiisidei'abie foi^esight on the part of the
T lines. It aaidi
The Anv^ is oui^ sons. It la even, to scma axtentj our daughters.
Its discipline—its militaify culture—iias become feciiliar. It
is a p«.rt of the liation^ n^t an alioji alsiuent.
We cannot know the future^ but we juast infer tiiSt in years to
coja© . . . the Anr^ will be a part of our lives as it never has
bean before in peacetiirio.10
Another editorial written in the aaue year again apoka of the impor-
tance of the Ar.erican postwai' militaiy:
lb
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. . . The iailit£.ry policy which this coiintiy pursues after tho
w&r, end the size, the basis and the crganis&tlon—in short, the
effectivauess—of the anriad forces which it ittintains ar© such
ijopoH«at factors in the moderu world that tl;8y will profoijudj^
influence all other problojifi now under discussion. They will
influence o^xx' political ^ social and econcaaic life axid the wl.ole
natiorud psyciiology.^
The postwar period s£w a pronounced drop in the percentage of
fsTorabiliiy found in Hew York Times * jailii&iy ccsncient. The influential
TJBies sougiit, in the confused aftenriath of tlie war, to throw strong
sti^port behind arsied forces' unification. In so doings it often
disciissed militazy deficie^icies that indicated to the Tmes that such
a merger was necessary. It wrote:
. , . The vitally S»|>oi*t3nt thing, clear as crystal since Pearl
Harbor, was to put an end t-:' separate Aiiv^*- and ll&ry plt;;irilrig
—
planiiing which involved useless duplication of effort^, wsctefu3.
ccjfipetition for Congrossional appropriations arid worse tiian
wasteful failui'tj to see the whole defense proble^u. as a single
picture—&nd to substitute for this trsditxonal but outmocfed
systsru central conti'ol and direction et the higJiest level. •^
An article by Drew Middleton in an April j 1918 H®; York Tlraes Surtdsy
Hagaaina also exemplified the increase in unfavorable postwar mili-
tary corsiient, Middleton, writing in a feature entitled. "The Baigma
Called 'The Militsiy hind,'" said?
, , , There htve been doubts expitssseu as to v?hetJiQr mi-litaiy
men should be entrusted \fith high political office. , . . they
/the people/ object to Wii&t Xdiej consider the soldier's special
cast of mind, wtiich stertis frosi his profession. . . , His respect
for authority, his belief in discipline^ his reluctance to
e»ibrace the radical. . . . The result is frequently an instinc-
tive irt^atience with those ^lo do not confona to his code. . . .
the civilian usue^Ucf has a more open, more elastic mind then the
soldi ei" oi sailor, . , ,
I ,1". '**Gr..
fi" i(-tii A
65
But perhaps the jsost serioua of all difficiilties facing tlie 8T«rag«
military man in a political job is his instinctive attitude
towf.rd the peopls. To him the people of the United State© is "a
great beaet," mipredictabla,, ci-uol, lacking in gratitude and good
sense. 13
Despite the postwar drop in favorability, the majority of
Tines' coiaraent was still pro-military. A 19h9 editorial entitled,
Brass Hata." 8x>oke of the coBaaente of Beinard Bai*ach regarding tl^e
"patriotic contributions to the nation of the Ihiitad States Airray^
Navy axid Aii Force leaders." Baruch was quoted by tl:io Times as linking
professional soldiering witn a love of liberty." ' The Tii&es also
praised Secretary of Defense Johnson in 19h9 for his stand against
discrimination. It wrote: "Defense Secretary Johnson's directive
•gainst racial discrjljRination in the cJTied services is soimd in
15principle and practical in its approach."*^
The Chicago Tribune
The reseaixjh sample dstsimlned that the majority of the
Chicago Tribune's military coasBBent during Uie stu<^' time fraiae was
unfavorable (see Table 17) . The Tribune was the (xnly daily studied
returning this result. It was found that favorability in this news-
paper' was u2 percent. In only three of the 13 years analyzed did the
Tribune rise above 5o percent in caraaant favorable to the arsed forces.
These were ^2 percent in 191JL, a higli of 62 percent in 1^14 3 and Sh
percent In 19hU, The lowest percentage reached in a single year for
Bxijf of the fjve newspapers studied, was tne Tribune's c6 percent in
1939. It was during this first year of the war in ^^irope that
Colonel McCormick, editor and publisher of the Tribune, sougiit to
CJOtfe
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Influence the newspaper's r-eaders toward isolationism and atrict
neutrality. This policy setrfied t^;. res-ilt in freduent hostile Tribune
cc«3.':eat sgainst the militaiy. Wartiise Trib'Jiic oditorial irriting
cliKibed to higher lere3^ of favorebility but was sigriiTicantly lower
thaa the other four nei^spaperB, Postwar riilitfc.iy coinmeni returned to
near the LO percent favorable level (see JPigui'e 1)
.
TABLS 17.—An IteK directional anslysis of all coiranent coded for the
Chicago Tribune by yesr (l'y37-^y)*
Favorable Neutral Unfavorable
Number Percent NuHiber Percent UuEiber Pei'cent
1?37 18 7.2 1 2.6 23 6.7
1936 16 6.li 1 2.6 20 5.9
1939 9 3.6 3 7.7 26 7.5
l^ko U h.k 2 5.1 27 7.8
19hl u S».6 2 5.1 20 5.9
1^U2 33 13.2 6 15.U he 13.3
I9ii3 3ii 13.6 0.0 21 6.1
19Uli 29 11.6 9 23*0 25 7.2
1^15 27 10.8 3 7.7 37 10.7
19U6 Hi 5.6 5 12.8 29 8.U
19i47 10 l.o 3 7.7 17 ii,9
im 23 9.2 1 2.6 28 8.1
19U5 12 h,B 3 7.7 26 7.5
Total 250 100.0 39 lOC.U 3I1S 100.0
The overall percenta|;e of favorability of military coismont
found ir* tl:e Tribune in tho stuci^ ttme franie 'wr-S l2,0 . This -percentage
computation diac'^rdid all cocwient coded '^SUTEAL."
1. • - . 1 X .Ufl4T
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Two editorials printed in 1938 und 19hO respectively dis-
plsgred tho sharjmess of much of the Trlbunas'a prewar amimnX toward
t^.e military:
... In tlie Ubited States a majority of the people have ari
intelligait dislike, evai contertspt, for wars whicti n»ver ought
to hai^en. They not only are not militaristic but they tliink
ain-^orloiis sword rattling doBaonstrations on tlse part of
egotistic starftping little nten in high positions are discreditable
and criisitial, . . ,1^
The second vividly reflected toe Tribune *s position on tiie prewar
drsfii
... If conscription is adopted now . . . all of tlui l&zy and
inccanpetent officers in the arsiy will be safe. They will not
have to think. They cjm letire to the bwisJ^roofs of routine,
so busying thesiselves witii useless tasks tinat they will have no
tiise to learn how to figjit a modem war.17
The Trib'.me'8 prewar inilitary attitude can also be •sen in a
1939 editorial reflecting an the World War I efforts of ovor ar»ed
forces. It said{
, . . The officers spent the first six laoaths of tiie war tiylag
on new unifoxris and oti.erwise enjoying tiiejaeelves . mtu the
result tiiat no war was made, is late as August, 1918- tiie an^
ordnance corps had not yet decided what kind of caniion it would
aanufactixre when it got around to that manufacture.
The anEQT was bad enough, but the navy was even woirse. A asnBlX
part of it bee«^ a st^uadron Ln the Britisli fleet and the rest of
it was veiy busy, indeed j in t^ie more attractive metropolitan areas
of oui- country. Hany an engagenent took place in CJ-xicag: 's loop.
l8
The b<^innlng of the war saw little change in I'ribime coossaent
toward the anried forces. It rasained pred<»Jiinently negative, Mavy
./ .••.<?. I , r-f
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censorship and one of its Pft officore were strongly criticiaed in an
October. 1 li2 editorial:
. . it was officially adaaitted tact /Secretary of the Navy7
Knox (teceived the nation in his Pearl ffai'bor r-«port. The adbiie-
sion ceuiQ in a speech by the navy's chief press agant, Capt.
Lel&TKi P. Lovette. , . .
Certain eleiaants in the n^vy tjm as much to blow for what is
happening as ia the aeci^tary. They are out of touch with public
opinion axid consider thi;t the JustiJiabie ;;Tublic deiiiand for news
of wliat is going on can be repulsed in an arbitr&ry Sianner. _
Stiqpidly, they do not see the damage they do to national jrsorale.
After censuring the United States military efforts through
the bitter defeats of Pesrl Harbor and early 19h2, the Tribune slovly
becaioe more favorable later in the wftr. This, however, was far from
a strong shift. In a July, 19hU editorial the Tribune prcdsed both
the AUierican fighting forces and industry but used the article to
attack President Roosevelt. The piece, entitled "That Hilitary
Qeniua in the Ifihite House," said:
... If we nave recovered froRi our initisl. blunders, the credit
goes chiefly to the same Merican industry that thruout /si-cj
his administration Hr. Roosevelt has harassed j and to the gal-
lantry of the Airierican fighting men whose self-reliance Mr,
Eoosevelt has persistently, but unsuccessf\illy, sought to
destroy.^^
The postwar Tribune again returned to editorializing against
deficiencies within the military system. Militaiy ^^lustice, the officer
corps, the Piilitsry ''cjiste systesi," coiTuption among Americsn occupa-
tional troops and a laggard discharge rate were some of the alleged
shortcomings that becait^ subjects for Tribune comment against txie
r\ftUi r { :i\t. -iMm^^
,
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airaed
, earvices after the war. In iprtl, I9I46, an editorial entitled,
"Military Durocracy /alcj' saidj
. . . For the firat time in our history the anuy really got its
hands on the civilian economy duiing Wie war. It is reluctant
to let go. If its hold is not shaken loose and the niimber of
its officers reduced to sensible proportions this country will
be cursed pencuanontij? Qy a militny caste ss arrogant^ and
xiltiifistejy as anti-republicsn, as was the niilitary caste of
Prussia . ^^
Late in 19i»6, the Tribune hired retired Kavy Vice Adudral Fredrick C.
Sherman to write analytical articles concerning naval affairs for the
newspaper. Shennan's hiring sensed to mark a slight turning point in
Tribune editorial policy toward the militaiy. After this even^. Sheitnan
wrote several feature pieces partial to the Mavy aixd the Tribuoe^s
ccawaent toward the anaed foitjes began to be soirsewhat laore favorable.
Teti in the next two years %x never reached 5>c; percent favorability
and again dropped to only 32 percent in ISkS, Figure 1 shows these
fluctuations.
The Los Angeles Tiines
The Los Angeles Times ' coirdaent regra'diiig the j&ilitary w&s 71«y
percent favorabl& over the time frajie of the stu<fy (see Table 18).
This represented the highest favorable percentage of the five papers
exsffdnod. This large West Coast journal was strongly favor'-ablo in
ccRjRienting on tVie services in the prewar and war years but was foxmd
to drop significantly after the war (see Figure 1), It reached a
peak in favorable cc»5fs;ent of ^2 i^ercont in 1938, carried throi^h the
war with all yearly figures in excess of 80 percent favorable and
JKvtfiKi
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dropped rapidly in tne postwar period to a low of 33 percent in 19h9»
TAflUB 18,—An iteri directional analysis of all comment coded for the
Los Angeles Tiaes bjy year (1937-1v)*
Favorable Heutral Urifavor ble
NtBhber Percent Mufflber Percent Number Percent
1537 Ik 3.7 0.0 k 2.7
1938 11 2.9 1 l.k 1 0.7
1939 16 1.3 1 l.U 3 2.0
1910 2ii 6.3 6 8,6 8 $*k
1911 29 7.7 1 l.Ii 7 h,l
19h2 he 10.6 22 31. ii 10 6.8
19h} $h 1)^.3 6 8.6 10 6.8
1911 $1 15.1 6 11.
1
12 8.0
19U$ $U li;.3 8 11. li va 6.8
19k6 19 $.0 10 Hi.
3
21 lii.2
19h7 22 5.8 2 2.9 11 9.5
1918 Zk 6.3 3 1.3 19 12.8
19l9 Hi 3.7 2 2.9 29 19.6
Total 378 loo.o 7C 10).0 11.8 1CKj,0
The orerall percentage of favorability of military CdSRient
foTjnd ia tiie Times in the stiwfy time frame was 71.9 . This percentage
ccffuputatiun discaxded all cor<^>^sient cod^ -'NEUTEAL.-'
The prewar West Coast attitude toward tfie armed forces was
clearly seen in a San Francisco Ctironicle editorial which appeared in
the Los Angeles Times in JxQy, 1939. The editorial wrs entitled
^
"Brliig the Fleet Back!," and expressed the desire that the ships that
tee Havy had I'elocated to the Los Angeles area be returned to horiCport
at San Francisco where th^y had tied up previously,"'' Tides' cosasent
so tft
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indicfvted that ts-s Navy was alao weiccaiie in Los Angeles,
WartiHie coaameat by the Tiiues continued f-r-vorable. Writer Lee
flbippi^ ia his dai2^ ool\u&n called; "Leeslde^*^ said of the amied
forces in l^liii, "... This war is such & co-operative thing that
Aimjf, Navy and Ccest Gufad wcrk together so yon can hardly tell which
2'iis which." -^ When General Stillwoll was recalled fross China in late
19kh after ixn alleged conflict of opinion with Chiang Kai-Shek, the
Tiraes supported hi© and wi*ote, *'. . . How sxiccessful he has been . . .
is indicated by the fact that it will take twc generals to replace
0),
hita.""^
The postwar years saw a decrease in the favor&bility of Times'
military coaunient. In 19U6 the sample indicatad t; .it the Los Angeles
tijaes, for the first time in the study
,
droT>p©d below $0 percent in
cooosent favorable to the armed services. After a rise in 19h.'J , a
second sharp decline was noted in 19kB''h9* The 19h6 drop was exsKipli-
fied by a Times * editorial in April of that year. It disclosed the
growing inter-service qixarrellng that influenced the research findings
in all five stac^ newspapers. It saidj
. . , tlie vicious caiapaign carried on by some Savy luen agains*
KacArthxir ha© not dir^iuished the esteen. in which most of tiie «<
people of the United States hold the general •s wiusual talents.
In 1916 Joseph and Stuart Alsop vrrots, '' . . in the interests of
national security, it is essential tiiat the long drawn out feuding
26between the services bo brougist to an mid,^ A X9h9 Tinies ' editorial
entitled J "Let Us Have Peacelj" said?
.u ill
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• • . It /the aavy-Air Force feucG^ has been fought too long in
tlM dark recesses of the Pantagon jand the twilight of anoi^ioua
BMBftorajida arid pr«ia«di.t£itdd "leaks" of official correspondanCQ,
. . . For . . .it will not be the planners in V/ashiiigton VhO
will detenaine the exact siiap© of World War III .... It will
be tbe eneroy. And that enaay is counting heavi^^ on the disunity
which he^believes, not without evidence ^ is the fatal we.ikness of
freedom.'^'
The Hilwaukee Joamal
Military ccgaissent in the Milwaukee Journal saaple wag 69.1
porceat favorable over the tiiae span of the study (see Tabls 19),
The Journal's prewar cosaaent rose gr^idufxUy with the exception of a
steep rise to 87 percent favorable in 1936. There was no e-r^y war
drop in 19k2, Later wartiiae camrx&iit was vary favorable, reaching a
peak of 93 percent ia 191x3, A lar-ge postwar drop ei^erged when favor-
ability slid frciffi 80 pe^xent in 19kS to 39 percent in 19h&* Another
sharp climb occuired through I?li7-ii8 followed by a plunge to a stud^
low for the Journal of 28 percent in 19h9 (see Figure 1)
.
Journal prewar militaiy comcient was liuiited. routine and
§tn»r£lly favorable. The usual pr&isee wore rocor<^d on Airtjy and
Mavy Day and an occasional fi'iendly featui'e article was written as
the nation approached the war. Althcragh the peixjent&go ox favorable
COBBient towsrd the militaiy did not diffiinish in lyli2, the Journal
did ejqaress editorial dissatisfaction with the Navy at Pearl Harbor.
It wrote:
To the error on the U.S. Navy's record for its n«^lg«!HJ« at
PmiTl Harbor must now be added enotkiOr regrettable mark. The
Havy reported 11 Bliwauk«ieaaB as detd after the debacle.* » » » •
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But one by one ... it has been proved Ihst ell these ««© w^sm
not killod. Today oinl^ two ... are "etill dead." The »«f7
was not only not alert to defend Poarl Harbor; but it vam not
&vt3i\ prepi.fed, to repoxi:.;, with any seiablance of ©fficieiicy, its
losses. . . ,*'^
TABIii 19.—An its© directional an&lysis of all coBwaent codsd for th«
Milwaukee Jouru^Al by yeer (1937~U9)*
Favorable Neutral Unfavorable
Suniber PorcePxi HiBuber p83*C«nit Kumber Percent
1937 10
1938 lii
1939 11
19k) 17
15il ko
19h2 32
1913 ho
1911; U6
19U5 iik
19U6 21
19'U7 20
1918 33
191*9 10
Totcl
3.0
li.l
3.3
5.0
U,8
9.5
11.8
13.6
13.0
6.2
5.9
9.8
3.0
2
h
8
s
8
6
2
3
3
0.0
0.0
li.3
8.7
17.1
2.3
10.9
ll.l
13.0
ii.3
6.5
6.5
8.7
6
2
6
8
15
11
3
7
n
33
16
6
U.o
1.2
U.O
5.3
9.9
7.3
2.0
I1.6
7.3
21.9
10.6
5.3
16.6
338 100.0 li6 100.0 151 100.0
ihe overall percentage of favor^ibility of military corjBfient
found in the Journal in the stui^ tifiie frcme was 69.1 . I'his pei-centage
coraputetion diac^rrSed all coeiment coded "KEUTRAL."
At the war pr^pressed, Jouru&l jailitary ccsaraent h&c&m.® quite
favertible. In 19l3 it s^id; ". , . Americans may b© proud of their
figniting forces, in cajs^s, on leave, in front line posix-lons.'-'' ' In
19ii5 the newspaper supported General iiisarmower despite acsr^e public
mrJ lot t)0boo ^ oA— .U 'Ji^<
L »,Li,
MM tft '^ *^«>/'k^ J
>;J,
>v«l
criticiap. of the Allied high casm&nd duriag the "Bsttle of the Bulge."
It wrote:
, , . Gen. Eisenhower loomed aa great Ml /b1c7 coifaBiander gx\6.
l©?.der in the dark hours of reverse as haTdit! during the brilllaat
Sctccesses in France. By that »tp..ndai^j he deserves of the British
arid American h<^ie fro^its a loyalty as coosplete as that he has won
froirv h'^s closest military associates,^''
The postwar period found the Kilv !.k-;a Journal Kiaced 5n
attitude towaxti the militaiy. Jcui^ial caraEient was 39 percent faTorcble
in lyl6. In July, 19ii6 the newspaper wrote in an editorial entitled,
"And Unification is Del&yed;"
Theie is no longer tiie sligtitest do^t tliat divided coaKsandj
intsraervice rivalries ,- and lack of army and navy co-ordlaiation
and liason Ijoviteci jui5t sucr: n terrible siiilitary disaster as
the n-''!.ti:>ri suffered at PQ&rl Harbor. 31
After a st©a<^ ciijsb in f&vorability in 19i;.7-li8, the Journal 8Kax<FCijr
withdrew its ediiorial support from tixe arnsed sei-Vices in V^U9,
Again., the inier-service quarrel between prjjraaxily the Air Force
&rid K€%vy seasied to offer tii.e reason for tiie change. In Octoberj lyli9
tne Journal , writing on President Truia&n's dia^iisssl of Admiral
Denfeld as Chief of HhvsI Operations,, said in an editorial entitled,
"The Ad&iral Coiadn't Stay":
, . The casisfcnder in chief could not surrender to what Gen,
Bradley called the open rebellion of the navy against the
unification prograsi and ag^nst tr^e tr^iditional American principle
of civilian control of ti.e aj^ed forces: , , , . these navy officers
tried to defeat the law of the United States. 32
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The Haadllne Analytli
Tha headline analysis stiowed that the sample headlines were
strongOy non-directional (see Table 20). It also revealed Uiat, of
trjose headlines that were detemined to be directional, there was a
strong correlation with the findings in the item directional analysis.
The Washington Post percentage of favor&bility for the item analysis
was 58.7 and its headline favor&bility percentage was $5.0. The seme
figures for tir.e Hew Tork Tlaies were 71.1 percent and 71. ii percent j for
the Chicago Trib\me , h2,0 percent and 37.1 percent; for the Los Angeles
Ti^es, 71.9 percent and 66.3 percent; and for the Milwaukee Journal ,
69.1 percent and 62.0 percent. As in the itewi directional analysis,
oiily the Tribune printed jaoi-e unfavorable than favorable headlines
regarding the arned forces.
The Grephica Analysis
The graphics analysis determined that the five newspapers
studied used little graphic material wiien cojamenting on militaiy
matter over the study time frame (see Table 21). The graphic material
that was judged to be directional in the sea^led newspapers was strongly
favoj:&ble in each. There was no dose correlation between the direc-
tional graphic Kiatei'ial said the itwri directional analysis as was se«a
with ttie headlines. The Hew fork Times led in percentage of favor-
ability of the directional graphic material. The figure was 95.0
percent. The Washington Post had the lowest favorability percentage.
This was 56.5 percent. The Chicago Tribune , which had coKCiented the
least favorably toward the anaed sei^ices of ti^ie five newspapers in
*
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the item «nd h««dlin« dii actional anfOorwWi ahowed hi^tly favorable
in the dii-eclional graphic raaterial analysia. The percentage waa 91.9*
The directional anaSysie showed that the coBtoined attitiide of
the five newapapera exasaiiKid was favorable tovjard ^La miiix-axy. C^y
the Chicsgo Trlbime showed an overall imfevorsbl© average within the
«atire tise fr«»e of the art-udy. A atrong variance was d5.scovered
between ttie Triteane and the other newspapers isssd in uib reseaitjh, The
III ri I imm I
significsnce of tlic Tribune's unfavors^le coirjment, hcm&r^r^ did not
change the easential finding. Th© Washington Post 'a attituite toward
tiie arr.ed services although favorable ir^ tne rseeax'ca , wa© not strorigly
BO, The ]r«saaining three newspapers showed laore obvioua strei^h in
a^J^sporting the nation* a military forces. The findings wei-e consistent
in both tise it«a and headlines aneOyaea for each net-jspaper^ but this
w^ui not ae^a in titie graphic matter analyais. Theae resiilts amm to
establish the validity of Hypothesis III.
Figure 1 traced ©oiue xnteresting patterns over the lengthy
tiA0 fra»e used. The wide variseace between the ecament found in the
Qiicago Tribune and that of the other four JouiT*als was clearly evident
and oiie of the Kost significant findings of ^tm atu<fe'. The consieteacy
of ccraRftnt foxmd in the Mew jQVk Times was al^o apparent. In wartime
this daily's ccuaaent wss ^out 90 percent favorable, and in both prewar
and postwar tiie favorsbility was coriBistentily near 6j p. •;Q-t. TheiHs
was also on obvious drop in favorability Isy all five new^japers
ISBBadiately following World War 11. Finally, the fluctuatiisg favorability
8V
sa
aBVJvd
r .o«
.ill iWd^Wf
.i,U * y_^.w ' ; .MV'.
79
of corament aeeii In the prewar yearo disclosed no clear patteXTa, These
were yQ&re of reletlvely limited coBa.ient on militaxy topics. The
favorability of caaraBnt declined in 19U2 in fottr of the five dailies
,
The only newspaper to record an increase in .., c- xirst year of tue war
Mtm the hilwaiikee Journal . This inci^ease was one xi^rcent.
The test ox Hypoti esis II returned inconcltisi ve findings based
on t'<>e patterns outlined sbove. There was no gradual upward tendency
in f&vorablcnass seen in Uio prewar period. "Hie predicted loweriiig of
favorability was seen in 19^42. however the declines were not sharp.
The favorability foreseen for the war period was evident and the down-
ward trend expected afterward was strongly evident. The validity of
the autiior^s "Toasgr "theoiy" will be disciissed in the concludir^
chapter.
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CRAPTEE V
THB FOCUS ANAUSIS
• • . Since /a quantitative preaentaticry^ briiiga . . . the
evidence , .~. into intelligible focus 7 . . relationships and
diXferonces emerge t^iat could not so easily have been observed
without this reduction of the data. SiJCh £a analysis reveals
wiiat events or issues wore of special interest . , . ,
The test of Hypothesis I? analysed the eaB?)hasis of the roilitaiy
ecnnent found in the five influential dailies studied. It was hypothe-
sized tlip-t the focus (i.e., major emphasis or central thaae with
military iuiplicstions) of the cosjaient would be similar across trse five
newspapers studied. This hypothesis wss geaerally confii^ied but soiae
minor inconsistencies were noted.
The focus analysis Wfcs divided into the seven sub-cati^ories
listed and defined in Appendix A. Three new sub-periods were estab-
lished within the time frasie of tiie stu^ for ansdyaing tlie focus
materisO.. These were s prewer (1937"IX) , wartiiue (l^l+S-uS) and postwar
19l464j9).
The Washington Post
The research showed that the i&anagcusent sub-ca.tego3y w&s tlie
unit most frequently foimd In the Washington Post^s militarj'- ccsamcwt
(see Table 22). This sub-categoiy w<;s heavily dispersed through eech
of the three sub-periods , however^ a plurality was found in the postwar
s^^aent. In a January ^ V/ud editorial the Post wrote:
82
B:'J
BOCOB
9CJ
VI ftX
.i.; &uaQ.L f
ftiw (r
ft
tlWMSI
ob bra fHt
a;
It-
U30X"i
a ,
o +••
'H oP &.
^^ a
^a
JO, '
u
t,
Csl "*a
03
o
p-i
o
o
SB
*5
n
A.
«
TJ
oj »
s: O
*JI m
o t' »
•H t/ f-i
iS e- <3\
,--. o
'A SJ
v«^ G
H o
as
R
O
o
»5
o O o
CO 00 ^
^
<*>
H
00
CO
ON
o
o
CO
O
o
-^
H
o
o
5
00 f«% 0\ o
• * * •
CO ~i -o Q
-^^ H -:a OH
o. f- "^ OSH csj —ij
CO
CV)
CM
o
i
o
o
H
83
H r-i CO O
• • • •
H H l»w o
-3 -^ H H
;^ R
r-l % UN ^ R>
Jh
-ct 1 -=r «s ^
m i -3 t » »
'^^? f** •g Cvi -P-O1 rr\ -^ 8) -3
-!f
;« o\ O C\ O
^ rH :!2 H CkH ^
o O n
j-i
i
I i
i i
I: I. II
!l
8ii
In aeeking a mmssB to halt the leakage of information vital to
th« national security. Defande Secretary Porrestal aiust ccaapromi»«
between two dangers. On© ... is the harm ttiat cen be don© if
through indeacretion inQXjrtant date in the realm of militfiiy
research and teciinical progi'tMis continue to be made available to
potentifd enanrdes .... The danger on t3::e other side is that
ttie corrective will be more extroae tivan necessary-. . , ,2
This editorial was an ex«jmple of Post oosmeat focusing on militsiy
management £fter VJorld War XI.
Table 22 also revealed Uiat anaed forces' strategy was often
the point of emphasis in Post coraaent. This sub-categozy was Mentioned
second only to management in this newspaper. It was readily seen that
the greet majority of this msterial was written during the wartime
period. This area of coaanient was fonnd to center predcaainately on
Asiarican niilitary aceosaplishments or setbacks in aimt^ conflict with
the en^rgr.
The writer watched closely throughout the rese&rch for press
ccm-^ient regarding attitudes on defense si^ending. Little Has forth-
ccaaing. (Economic items ranked last among the stu<^"'s sevcai sub-
categories.) It was interesting to note., hovieverj "Uiat the lijaaited
Post econoBiic coirajient was confined almost exclusively to the prewar
period. Thirty of the 33 coded Post ^onemic it^ss ¥©re found during
this sub-period. It should also be stated that additional eeoaociic
caanent w^s found in several it^fis coded jis ccmbination. Sconoirdc
and other focus sub-categories were often noted in the seme article.
This situation was readily apparent in an editori^ written in July,
1^1,0 thcit s&ids « , « . We are assuied billions for defense. What
we lack is the organization and inteHigeait leadership required for
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tb«ir effectiv* utilization." This editorial touched each of three
»ub-categories: managcBkent , econatiic and leadership. The Poat led
all stu<^ newBiDaoers in the muiiber of individual Itmas classified in
Uiis manner. Eight and ti^o-tenths percent of all Post items were
placed in this etib-category.
The New York Timeg
The Mew lork Times focxised the greatest ajaount of its publialwd
military coraaent in the sub-category of strategy (see Table 23). The
majority of this opinion was published in the wartime sub-period.
However, military planning end Dreparedness was 8l,so heavily aiiphasized
in the late prewrr period. In a J\ily, 19lt editoriel entitled^ "The
Navy Relaxes PerfectioniSBi Somewhat, ' Ai^thur Krock wrote:
. . . pleas were made rer>eatedly without result in newspaper
depp.rtwents like this one long after it hsd becoirie evident that
existing anti-submarine methods were insufficient. , , , it is
higiier than high tiBie for tne N»vy to concentrate all snti-
suiasiorine craft off our coasts.'^
This reccaraaendation by Krock w?s an excellent exisHiple of Ticaes '
coiBment regarding armed forces' strategic planning. The Times was
particularly outspoken against the strat^ry ^aployed by the American
militaiy in 19l2 . That yoar ranked zs one of the most unsuccessful
in United States military history. Such factors as tne shock and
disillusiorBaent of public and Anny/^-3vy compl&cency leading to Pearl
Harbor, the soccessful invasion by the Japanese of the Aleutian
Islands, and severe naval and troop losses in the Solomon Islsnds
caused considerable critical eujnriient in this eminent Hew Tork newspaper
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during tue first yeixr of the W£r. Strategy continued to be heavily
editorialized trirough the war but was draii»aticalljr reversed in
diioction as was seen in Chapter IV.
Armed forces* managaaent w; e the second i&ost popular tneaaaie.
The TJJPtes utilized this sub-category nearly equally in both the
prewar and postwar contexts. The postwar period saw the advent of
a military organizetional crisis that kept armed forces managewient
extreeiely visible on wost of the opinion psges of the country's news-
papers. This crisis involved military unification and the establish-
ment of the Department of Defense.
The Times printed frequent socially significant coanment
regarding the military. For p^u^>oses of this stutfy all coeraaent
concerning anmed forces' censorship and propagandf< activity was
classified £s social. During the early part of the war the Times
editorisliaed extensively on this topic. Many reader letters on the
subject wei'e also printed by the Times.
The Chicago Tribune
The Cnic<-go Tribune was found to place its primaiy focal
emphasis in this study on the mivnagement sub-category (see Table 2u).
This anphasis w&s evenly spread over the three sub-periods outlined
earlier. Typical of prewar Tribune coiainent wes this editorial
entitled, ''An Army or a KobV," that deplored the Army's southern
training csiupst
... If the arsiy will bring up the rest of our troops frcsn the
concentration camps in the south . . . put th«ri in decent barracks
at 6wii©v©x \... . Mi^ib «-.v .jnd tsw X^.^^io,' Mi??
oi £it aieiio ilia b
-»>/»rr e'T'.vtm-oo orii Ic ac-st-rr no h:too 5111 lo lao« c .iv vlfi.,v3-iixft
tnaiunsDO fnr,:>±Jlmita vIX. fata *.t#-:Lr<:fiY'} h*,'. T'
saw \>^ '8©0-I0l '
1 «.,v >4tJU—
Ai^
mvQ I
! r-f..*
,LttX^i^ii«
OJ
1 C « 09 _;:J CO o
o
^
• « •
v. r^. CO .'^ Q
•P ft. f^ r^ -'^ O
*-^ «J H
0\ t^ r?
.^ '^-^T*
1
^
•
^ \J\ Csl CNf^ c H H <^
r^ B SK
t?s oH
i , 0\ CO r^ o
s 1
• *
CO
t
CO
*
+» « c- Cvj ^A fH (5
ffl *-s+i H
^ ^0 «
« ^ » \ss O (O c*\
J
« o <r\ G\ CJ
e-*
12
- fv- eo Xf\ OO
g
4^ • * <* •
to P -S pH r^ o
cS
^i ft. fn <^ f^. oo H
^ XT: W
d Vk* ffiP5 « r-i vO G\ vO
e c o VN U\ r>-
S ;s se H
x: .--^
**^
«M O
o ^ p. • f"-- r-j HI Ofn •n
-r»
ft
W © JTt V \A -ij d o
•^ Cs.
^S A^ Oi -^ m Qej 1 H
1 "^
^8
-3 O
1 On O ^
V 4»
o * -3- r^ fn Ot^ o o -p •
^.> H o rn r^ <n ^
05 tt g 0- niN (n ^ o
<~s O H
«D ^ c
43 •g "w o
r< I o • -M^ —3 -:3 C\i© 'O ia o H
K'S^
s
l
v^w»
•
-:! C^ On O
c
•^
+> » • «
^ o \r\ cs
?^
o
o c ^ CNi o
^ *-x^ HV OJ +>
-p >.-"H
^ H c a VN H O
o o fn H ^J •o
^ a< JSO
u
o
x> » <n f^ .-ri o
g +» • • «p r-i « o\ <n f^.. ^£1^
c * ft. cy VTN H
^.'»-. 'H
1 clE
1 05 • CJ o f-v lA
• o eg -;3 H r«-
7T gK
(\t
s
m ^d 1^ ^^
<^ S « .3 t 18 • •^
E-< S ^* t^ f> OE ^ W«3 p«3 On o >. o
I &.?< rsr-i 0, r-l £H
88
86
Ji
i !
^ M f-
^
6^
where they will be ..Xfcrdod opportunities for recreation ;, and
then rerjiiire iiulit&iy deoortmait of thesij we will create un
ainiy. Otherwise, it will continue to be a Hiob.5
During the war the Tribune continued to ccmnent strongly on armed
foi'cea* management weaknesses. An Aprils 19U2 editorial concerning
the burning of tie troopship Norm^mdie at a Kew lork pier saidj
. . , the /^o3:TSi&ndie7 disaster uncovered gross inefficiency &nd
division of autijority in the navy dapinrtBient .... The spectacle
of an organization sitting complacently by, unable to guard agfojiat
recurreint fires from ths sajae cause in wht-t is essentially a
routine industrial operation does not inspire confidence in the
/organization' s7 ability ... to direct the delicate and haaard-
oua operations of naval warfare.^
The Tribune's -"ttitude tovrard iajjlitary ttf-nagefrient essed sofae-
ittiat following wTorld V/ar II ^ but the the«ie was still Colonel
McCoruiick's favorite trtien ©ditorializijiig about the armed services.
Universal Military Training w&s im aspect of postvfiir jiiilitary mansige-
ment that caused frequent coE3B«at, An April, 191*9 iett«r published
in the Tribune reflected public interest in the new militaoiy draft*
It WGs written by an arr?^ draXtee. Re wrote frosi Csmp Gordon,
Georgia:
I fesr that the ordlm^rj citisen is unaware of the plight of the
draftee under the new draft setup that Truraan put over on Congress,
Ihe morale of the , . . di'aftees in the arBjy is rather low at
present. . . ,'
Articles concerning the strategy sub-category with the
predoKiin&te m^h&Mts in wartiaie were the T ribune ' s second he&viest
ares of concentration. This large Chicago daily also coBsaented often
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on military leadeistiip. General Boijgl'is JfiecArthur received signi-
ficant ffupyoi-t ©dioorially ui the Tribune . He was called ^'one of tue
great captains of all time'* &.nd lauded as a 'stateamsin" in an edl^*
a
torial at the oaaA of the war.
The Loa Angeles Tiaiea
The Los Angelas Tjir>e3 Placed its strongest focal eimph&sis on
strategy during tne w£i.r (see Table 25) . MsxxrigeKient was located in
second place. This large Los Angeles joiij-'nsl carried the respected
Wfilter LippiBXinn coluianj "Today and ToTiiorrow.'' Ona of Lipjaacja's l9hh
colunns illustrated the type of writing i"8garding stri^tegy that was
genersHj' found in tha Los Angeles Tjioes, He wrote»
. . . ttie grand strategy under wbicV! Americans are waging war
in the Pacific and in Europe h£is been detenained by the hig^
coiBP^iind of the American Navy and the Aiftericen Arw^, ... it
is tiiolr- /^fierican citizorjjs/ ligl.t to know that the issue /Che
war's outcoia©7 is staked on &. strategical pl.jai which has been
dcitoiT.iinod by the long-coiisidered and deepest pxofessicntd
coiivictione ox tae American Arny and the American Sl&vy.-''
KancgGErient cmsa^nt was found well dispersed asiong tiic thr«»
sub-periods; rto^^erer, the armed forces' unification struggle in tne
late l';?]iiOs seeifiod to result in somei^iat more raanaganent ^iphasis
durix^ the :>ostw&r s^pnent.
TM Milwaukee Journal
Hilittry RanEgeiaent became the most frequent opinion sub-
category found in tlie JHilwsukeQ Jom'nfel portion oi the research (see
Table 26) . The Joui;nial deviated slightly £t<m tb© other newspapers
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CKastin«d in that tiie Idadei-'Ship subocategoiy wes second. A wartljae
•dltoriJil about American soldiei-s In trainirjg cnmp axesBplified the
JoumaLl' a attitiKi© toward the militaiy iii a ffianag«&®it eituation.
It saids
After careful smTey of anigr caBips tiio office of war inforcation
reports that the American people rosy well be proiid of the
•obriety sad general b^iavior of oiir troops in training. . . .
they ai'e wholesale b^ond anything hoped for by aiilitaiy le&dere
here or alse^ez^, . . .^^
The Joomal oft«ni cowmented on the quality of leadership
displayed in the arKed forces. Oeaierols Eisenhower ^ HacAirthur end
Marshall and Adteirsls Hlffiitz and King were mentioned frequently in
all forms of cosaaont, Strat^jy slipped to third piece for the first
tiiue in the an^CLysis of the five newsp8|>ei^s.
It was noted with int#JnM% that th© economic sxib-^categoiy
liBQked last ajicaig the seven tested. It Siiould not, however, be
assumed tlxat these aeyspapei^ avoided eammm on military fins^cial
matters. As mentioned in the Washington Post ane^sis, many articles
coded in the cofnbinaticn sub-categojry ccaitained cosaaent on lailitars''
spending, A ra-check of tr-e research coding ©onfixmed that this was
fr»r,uently true of all five newspapers aaalysied.
It should also be mentioned that each of these five influential
dailies jenlously gus-rded the American society's First Amendra^at
freedosKs by coBaaenting freely on military censorship policies in the
World War II period. The Hew Tork TiKes se®&ed to lead the press in
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d^loring the early wprtiirte militaiy information policies. It wrote
in October, I9h2i ' , . . The practice of witikholding bad news, or
fluiiking gocxi xmiw soimd even better than it is. is costing tne armed
serrices hesvlly in loss of public confidence," Althoiigli it did
not rank hi@i among the seven areas of focsl analysis ^ the social
sub-category wes & signific«at aiea of cosffi^it in all newspapers of
the stii^jr.
Hypothesis IV sensed to be confInaed regarding the siost
fi-ecuently found 8u4>*c&t©gories. In all newspapers except the
Milws'okee Journal
..
the most heavily i;^»ed theses were either manage-
ment or strat^y. In the Jo^xm&l , mtn&gcasftent led but leadership edged
into second place and pushed strate^r into third position. The
fiiiding of either manageisient or str&tegy at or neas- t^:e top among
the mven sub-categories tested in ea©l:i r«wapaper seooaed to coafina
Hypothesis Vf for the leading sub-categorie®.
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FOOTHOTES FOR CEAPTBR ?
\'illiam 0. Aydelotte, "Quantification in History,'* The
Aiaericsn Eietorical Review , lixi, Ho. 3 (1966) , p. 8oS,
Editorial^ Washington Post . January 235 19lS. sec, 1, p. 20.
Ibid., July $, X9hOt ©ec. 1^ p. 8.
^Mitorija, New Tork fimea , July 2, 19ii2, sec. 1, p. 20.
"Editorial ^ Chicago Tribune ^ October 12, l^iil, sec. 1, p. 18.
^
Ibid
.
, April 21, 19U2, »ec. 1, p. 12.
^Letter to the Editor ^ Chicago Tribune , April 18, 19h9>
• 1, p. 26.
"idiiorial, Chicago Tribune , October 16, 1916, 996, 1, p. 10.
^Editorial, Los Angeles TJjgies , April h, V?kh, sec, 2, p. h.
^^Editorial, Milwaukee Journal, Jaauaiy 3, 19^3, sec. 5, p. 2,
^^itorial, K«ir Tork Times, October 23, 19h2, sec. 1, p. 20.
.'Si
CHAPTSE VI
THS CGNCLUSIOS
Quantitative procwlui^s by no means preclude, nirr indeed can
thiy possibly eliadnate, the use of value jud^nents^ speoulatiozis^
intttUigent guesses or the ixM^cination end Intuitive feel which
the historian, and . . • the social scientlgrt, should bring to
his suJt>jeet« v^at is gained 1^ attoi^ting such exactitude as
the clreunstdnces allow is not finality but reasonsdsle credibility,
not the elimination of subjectiT© factors but the minindslng of
their role,^
The purpose of this stwfy was to exadne a se@isa«nt of press
eoameot regarding the Ai&erican sdlitaiy orgsctisation during a period
vhen the axmeA forces becsdse greatly involved in the A»ericsEn soeiet^^
due to the Second World War «ead the advent of the Cold War«
The author's basic ^wms' tli^ozy** was fomied over several
years of both educational and railita:qr szperlenee* However, ^le
thought of expandii^ and testing Uie validity of the theory did not
occur witil recently. It was also r&GQ^±%^ that the theory was not
original, but an exa:ainati<:m of it by analysing iniTLu^iitial pT9im
eoonent eoneeming the silitazy organi^&^ion sNsemed to be ai unsKplored
area. The writer's use of the tera "Toisd;^" was not an entirely
adequate reflcKstion of th© Briti^ soldier of Klplii^'s po^sa. However,
it csmm close to conveying the writer^s intsx^ded jsesning*
The four hypotheses emui^erated in Chs^ter I wsi-e the results
of tliis idea. The findings and conclusions of the preceding three
chapters, which discussed quantitative asjount, direction aaad focus, will
be briefly sim^arlxed in this chapter. The author will also atten$tt
an intezpretive eoi^lusion regarding the **TaBisy theory<^ and its
validity wh^a cosipared with this reiHiareh data« A description of
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tiw coder rsli«l>lJ.ity cheek used and suggest iijona for furtlicr r»«Mixoh
WiJLl conclude tbe ebapter.
The cuantitatiire area of this siuc^ began with sn exr^liiatio^
of the lOftoxunt and type of militazy camsmnX fovsoA in Uia five nevs*
papers used. Chapter III anal^ed tn& dat& using three Beasurlng
iostn^ents. these were: ttes tsmtoBr of iieias found, the nuiaber of
coXuam iiiches of i|^aee priated for these it®K8 and tim identification
of the type of ite^i. Itmn type was divided intc taree parts: ®ii-
torials, fee-tures &nd leti,«rs to tho editor. The Wsslilngton Post led
in botii the mxalmr of oocsiient it^^ys printed Msd tot&l colusun inches
of spaee devoted to ttiese itmm. Tbis Post also led In total ©ditorisls
and letters to xhe editor. Tbs Sew Tork Tlaies w&s the feature item
leader.
Ch^tei- 17 observed the directional aB|>hasi8 of tii© stu^.
A Chi~ac\2&re test was accc^^isl.ed in this ehspter in order to cnsck
the statistical aignificsnc® of ti?© study figures In botii w&rtiej© and
non-wart JJEQ contexts. 5ne itsKS were coc^d in three directional
categories* These categories s*©rHs; favorable, aeutrsl a»d unfavorable.
The Los Angeles tipss led the stiuiy in the percentage of Itaas fomvi
to be favoi'4-ble to tiie ai:ii»eo forcse. th& Nefe* ICork YJbR€« en^ Milvmitese
Jottmal were near the Los Angeles daily in favorability, Hoi-e iMsn
half of all coded cojraaent conceniing te« military was foiuid to be
unfavorable in tbe C^iicago Tribune . The Saw Tork Tiises led the stud^
In the percentage of headlines that vexn favorable to the services.
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Directional graphic matter h&b highly JCavorable in each of the five
newspapers V with the higjiest farorability seen in the New York Times.
Chapter V determined whet SLce&a of focus were most prevalent
in the study. Seven focal sub-c&tegories were established for tiia
project. Tliey wei^: social, political ^ econojRiic, leadex'ship,
Banag^xentj strategy and cc^ibination. The study time frauie was sep-
arated into three stab-periods in oi^er to shrink the cijsabersame
natura of the table forir^at and create a larger n upon which to baas
perceatag©. Haiiagemsnt and strategy led all sub-categories in each
newspaper exaiQined ^itri a. ai^igl© exception. Le^ership was the
second most frenuent »\:^-oategory discovered in the Milwaukee Journal
and strategy wfcs third.
Chapters III . V« ^nd V revealed that the foui- hypotheses of
tne stud^ were basically confirmed by the research evidence. One
exception was ncfied in Hypothesis IX. Thex'S was no gradual upward
teadeacy in favorablensss of coir^ient towi^rd ti>e a-JMHid services
ai^roaching World War II. The research showed prewar favorability
tcjward tjie fiiilitaiy to be niixesd with ao clear pattern estab3JjBlied.
fl» "fOBaay theory"
the writer's ^ToiHBiy theory" sees a fluctuating American
civilian puWlic attitude towai'd its aiilitary organisation, in a
wartise context, amed sei-vlces' personnel are accepted and respected
l^ the American public, whereas in peacetime, civilian reactions are
souiethirig less than favorable. Hypothesis II was developed to ch^k
the validity of "U^is theory.
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If it is acceded tr.at the five study newspapers functionod
aa opinion le&dera in th«ir areas dui'iag tb© time frasie used in the
research, pxiblic attitudes in these areas might have been influenced
by the oorament printed in these journals. Therefore, the infonaation
gathered in the study ai^ have i&eaning in eaoBairang the ^*^mmy theory."
One argument concem^jag the iniluenee of editorial comsient on the
noiwpaper-reeding public should be discussed here. Within the field
of content analysis studies dealing with .journalism research there
has b<Mn soae support for the th@o2y that editorial coMsent is dif-
ficult to read in cojRparison with objective nmss writing. The tbeoiy
continues that such coisn^nt should be given little weight when
considering press infliience on its reader public, A recent content
analysis study by Moenette a»d Earick refuted this theory. th€;y
said that "editorials were found to be more readable than news
stories . "
'
There is evidence in the stuisfy twmcp&pera theisselves to shoi^
that they recognised the validity of the ''Ttaasy theory." Exsr^Iss
were foond in both wartime and non-wartime contexts.
^rly in World War II the Washington Post acknowledged that
the American people had traditionally paid little att^ation or respect
to their armed forces except in war. When discussing Ariirsr Ue^ it
said:
. . , Anay Day has neveir been an occasion to excite the Aiierican
people. WFe have been too steeped in paclfisei to take more than
passing notice of our martial achiev^sients. He have simply
tolerated our purQ'^ arilitary establishment. We have grudged Ars^
i\ air r> yp»t9
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ai^ropriations. We have never extended to the soldier the status
in our society which he occupies in other couatriQS. . . ,
3We have never been a railitery nation, . . ,
In I9W, the Chicago Tribune > although often unfavorable in its
««MMmt regarding the aniied forces, forsssw the importance of the
postwar military and offered a gliiiiner of insight into today's politico-
military probleans. The cosament also sho^/ed an attitude relevant to
the ^oaoff theory." It wrote in an editori&l entitled < "The Post-War
Aircy"
:
... An ade<:juate program of military and navsl prepar«An«i« will
not be accepted by the American people without dissent, our
pe&ce time lapses of tii© past have not bean wholly the fault of
the aAJiinistrraoi-s and powers in Wsehiiigton. The Aiaericen people
do not like military establisliments and do not like to spend
money on tha^. That pi^judica hts to be overcoEie if the nation
is to be made safe. . . .
The wilder the proposals to ko^p American troops on duty thniout
/Bic7 ti>e world, aiwJ to send thos to intervene in any quarrel
That may ai'ise on any continent, the harder it is going to be to
convince tne nation of ouj' need for protection. Fathers and
mothers of America want no pait of a post-war array if it involves
making lend-lease nercenaries of tiieir sons."
The Los Angeles Tiar.ea printed a reader editorial in 191*5 that illus-
trated the "ToBa^ tiheoiy." It said?
The glsfflaour and flag waving of war are soon forgotten aft-er
peace ccremu and the veteran becomes another ''probl^a*". . <
N6bo<^ would think of having . . . sei'viceKen over for Sunday
dinner. The glanioor would be missing, it wouldn't be the
mart trting to do. . , .5
After the wsr, a Maw lork TJjftes* re-i^r saw an urxhanged
i3»erican attitude. The X9k7 letter to ti^e Tiaes said:
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. . . When thft tiniM ar« critical we lean hdarily upon our
fellow-citiiiens who have devoted their lives to the Arayy Mavy
and Air Corps. Our whole existence and future and thst of oai*
cijildi-en is then largely in their keeping. Yet after the crisis
is successfully passed—to a veiy substantial degree throsigh
their efforts—we lose interest.
Fundane^iitally this is understandable and sound. Actually
^
however, is this attitude wise or fsir?^
In the ssme year tl-ie Kilwaukee Journal wrol^, ". , .If the American
army is demoralized now, the American people have done much to make
7it so. We are safe and selfish again." The next ye&r the Journal
again wrote:
. . Americaixs . . - lock with disdain or suspicion on military
men and military institutions—tLst is, until America happens to
need tuose milit&ry men to win a Wti-, They look on the pe&cetiaie
amy as a bunch of men strutting around in uniform; kill3.ng their
o-wn tifiiQ and wastiiig taocpc^ors' a.on^. . . .8
The research sample findings indicated that the fiv» vmm^
papers studied did comment much more favor&bly about the military in
the crisis period of the Second World W&i' than was dojie before or
after the coFiflict. The stiwfy sample also uncovered a sigaific«nt
deeline in favorrJaility in the first year following the war. A drop
was fomwi in each of the five dailies and four of the five lowered
favorable coniiaent by over >> percent. The Chicago Tribune
^
g drop was
approxiiaataly IG pex-cent. After VJhS, favorability peitjentages for
four of the study journals raaained generally lower than their prewar
figoi'es. The postwar Tribune military f&vorability was about hC
|^«*ttent. This was near the asms level of favor found in the prewsr
Tribune. The predicted postwar drop was, at first j seen as primerily
fli
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an outcome oi the inter-service sti;\!ggle ovar ti.e esti^blistment of a
unified coh'ur.and coricept (i.e., tha Bepaxtaieiit of Defenss). It was
detertftined , howevei'. that the pronounced decline in favorable ccanaent
after tlie war was dxie to several additional factors. For eacaiaple.
the 19U6 nadir w?is greatly irU'lTier<ced hy natioiial pressure to "bring
the bo3rs hocie" aa quickly as pofisible after the war. There seemed to
be a strong tniblic attitude that the armed forces were deliborateiy
slow In discharging porsotmal. Letters to tije editor were very
niDBisrous on this point. Ifofavorable ccaflHient also originated over the
civilian fesr of the establishment of a militiiry bureaucracy in the
American goveiTSKont, The inadecuaeies of mtlitaiy justice and iieveral
other pi-obrans found frerueut coim^^nt in the five dailies. Tb© favor-
ability drop seen in each of the stud^ newsp&pers in X9h9 was pre-
dottinately caused bir the unification struggle,
Prewai- favoi*able ccfiaent concerning the military did net
eo^are with the overall wartime level fotmd later in eech newspaper,
Tet, thei^ was no rising prewar pattern as predicted. The ifiixed
editorial attitude shown by the research may have been a reflection
of tne Mericsri fxublic apprehension du® to the ^reading war in Europe
and the Far iilasTi. The policy of isolationifflra had ccajsiderable public
»T:pport in those years.
The research findings iisiply a limited correlation between the
"ToBimy theory' and the newspaper coinBient observed. The five journals
analyzed in the stu<^ were picked on the basis of circulation and
gec^rapiiical location. Assuiuiag a reasonable aBiouat of influence on
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the general public by the atady newspapers and noting the editorial
readability factor determined in the Moznette and Earick: stud^,
coeament about the armed forces found in these five jounials siaould be
cotisidered to be a factor ir.i molding reader opinion toward the
nation's militaiy establisliment
.
Reliability
it reliability test was acccsiplished with cm independent coder
to deterBiine the extent of agreeuient with the writer. The test was
taken from the 'eculvslent forms method"^ described by Guido K.
9
Steimpel III. The test involved a ffieesui'SBient of 'Identical fre-
Guency tabulaiior-s" of the raaterial exacained by the coders.
The independent coder was instructed on the procedures used
in tiiis study and given 20 randomly selected items from the stud|y
•anple to code. These iteais were selected froj* the total nuxfiber of
cennent items used in the five newspaoers. A teble of randkas numbers
fo-ond in Content Analysis of Cogffitunications was used to iaake the it«B
selections. The extent of agreement between the independent coding
of these items and the original coding was 81 percent.
Suggestions for further Research
Further research might attaspt to carry forward the basic
stucfy mattiodology to the present time. It would be inteiesting to
discover if there was a rise in favorability through the Korean War*
Of siven more ccxiteaporary interest would be a stu^ leading to and
throTigh the Vietnam War. The coaparison of joumali^a attitudes
Mv ftm& t .iw^'r^s "lo tfr
i««^
!»• -^J
,'j •.,/
e^b
lOii
toward the military ©atfebliahaR^Dit over ma^y years could refVCal mean-
ingful data that mlg^.t bo oi' value to these two influential el^sente
of our society—the press and the mliltfeiy.
A stuify examining ten rather tb£m five newspapers of the
prestige pr«S8 over a shorter time frariis migiit also be £ii acceptable
project. Differing hypotheses coiK:eraliig press attitudes toiirard the
military might be tested.
The difference between the "Tora&iy theo2*y'^ sad the apparent
low level of favorable press ccBsaent toward the lellitsry at the present
tlBM would offer an interesting comparison. Tho pi^esent Vietn®i?i v ar
situatioa 8Ma»s to offer a paradox to the "Tc^Bsy theory" which was
found to have some validity in this stuc^-.
The research finding of an tsnusually low favorability per-
OKitags in the Chicago Tribune *s ccsKi^nt a^ut the axis^d foi^ss offers
a topic for study in itself. Colonel Eobex=t EcCoiisilck's personal
Military background and fervent patriotism seete inctsasistent wi.th this
low level of favorability. The ©actr^aaly outspoken editoidal policies
found in tiie Tribujae regaining isolationisfii and Pmsident Eoosevelt in
the 1930s and I^Os would also be fruitful areas for Q>jtantit,etive research.
FioBllyj it is suggested that further research develop a new
b««« line evaluation method in testing comment direction, ^oa
coiqpletion of this stuo^, the writer r-«cogni2;©d that the directional
findings se^ied to penalise those newspapers that offered constructive
criticism regarding military perfoxmsace . Such was not the writer's
intent
.
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Operational definitions used wsrss
FAVOKABLE
' »
Those items reflecting cohesion, cooparaticm. stabUity and/or
8tr®!^gth, Favorability will be judged <m the basis of amed forces
cooper«itiim in which tl^e ajr^ed forces or mi^ group or in<livi<lual
ri^pssenting the armed forces, is depicted as strtmg^ riubt or co-
operative. In internal affairs, favorebllity will be judged on tlie
bftsis of persons or groi;^ coo|>er&tiag in military affairs. For
ttOHBple, e«-eats &ad iucidaiits «^^ d^ict the aisaed force® , or m^
gjrani^ or Individual within tlie stxme^ forcfNB as progrsssive^ successful,
»oral, intelligent, lawf-ol, \mified or as exercisiiig leiidersliip will
be coasidered favorable, fhie classifieatioii will aot b@ assigaed
vhers the ansed forces or angr groi^ or individu^ thereof, is di^ietod
as esploiting its strssigtii upon weaker orgmslf^BXioxm
,
grotips or
iiidividusls.
mmmmM
Ihose it«Bs i^ich report c<mflict mid diaorgaisiisstioji sad
niiitary instability md/or weslmess. Oisfavor&bility will be judged
©a the biuiis of t^asioos ia which the aisaed forces,, or us^ group or
iisdividuBl representiag the anaed forces, is derplcted as wesk^ wrorsg
or uncooperative. In internal aff&irSj unfavorability will be .fiid^red
C81 the besis of military disruption in mleh there is coailic^ ueLiio^i
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persons or groups of persons within tlie ansed forces In militaaiy
affairs, ^or vKasspl9, events and incj.dents which depict the anaed
forces, or any groiqp or iiidividufcl within the ajsaed forces, as back-
werd, miKilitaxy, Ijaaioral, iiapractical, unlawful, diaimified or
l&cking in leadership will be classified as unfavorable.
NEUTRAL
Those iteais which reflect neither favorable or unfavorable
condition either througii balszice of content or lack of controversial
material.
EDItORIAX.
Written expression of biased opinion regarding per8<ms> puMlMMHIy
things and events.
FSATORS
Written OJCpression of fact and/or opinion regarding a subject
of particular interest,
LgfTgB.TO-THS~:gDITOR
A^y written correspondence suteitted to a newsp&per by one
of its readers and subsequently printed in that nevmpaper.
camasn:
The suas of three foress of journalistic printed matter defined
above (i.e., editorials^ feature and letter-to-the-editer)
.
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SOCIAL
Opinion r^arding the involvariont of the a«iied forces in gro\ip
or individual relationships with other groups or individuals,
POLITiaiL
Opinion regarding the involv«B?i©nt oT the armed forces in other
gorerrBaoital (less militazy) affairs.
BCCaKMlC
Opinion regarding the iavolvement of the ai-amd forces in
financial (inclnding budgetazy) scatters.
USADgRatlP
Opinion regarding the effectivenea® of the axiRed forces
(individual, group or unit) in coBSEianding respect and/or achieving
discipline
.
opinion regarding the effectiveness of the axised forces in
directing and/or training personnel Biad directing mid/or developing
material.
gfRATBSY
Opinion regarding the effectiveness of Wie &rsmd forces in
planning and cariying out warfare (priiaarily daring conflict).
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APPamxxB
The colling sheet design was:
1 » I T
2 y P T-H
3 C T
14 H J
5 L A T
didMi Section gage
Column 1^© of
1 Editorial
2 Feature
3 Letter to Editor
Direction
towHXxi
iLmed Forces
Foetid
towitrd
Anned forces
Direction
of
Headline
Direction of
Photo or
Editorial Cartoon
3 Farorable 1 Social 3 Favorable 3 favorable
2 Neutral 2 Political 2 Heutral 2 Heutral
1 Unfavorable 3 Sconoiaic 1 tfnfavoai^ble 1 Unfavorable
ii Leadership Hone Morie
5 Haaageeient
6 Strategy
7 CoiE^inaticn
Coding miit to be used; article
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